Follow Us

Facebooktwitterrss
≡ Menu

Dodge County v. L.A.S., 2017AP302, District 4, 8/17/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Under § 51.20(9)(a) the circuit court must appoint two licensed physicians or psychologists to examine and write reports on an individual subject to involuntary commitment proceedings. This requirement applies only to the initial commitment proceeding, not to the proceeding to extend a commitment. Read more

Facebooktwitterlinkedinmail
{ 0 comments }

Monroe County DHS v. T.M., 2017AP875 & 2017AP876, District 4, 8/17/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

T.M.’s parental rights were terminated on abandonment grounds under § 48.415(1). (¶¶2-10). She argues this violated her substantive due process rights under Kenosha Cty. DHS v. Jodie W., 2006 WI 93, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845, because the period of alleged abandonment included time during which the County suspended her visitation rights based on her failure to satisfy conditions it was impossible for her to meet. (¶14). The court of appeals disagrees. Read more

Facebooktwitterlinkedinmail
{ 0 comments }

Winnebago County v. C.S., 2016AP1955, 8/16/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

C.S. argues that §51.61(1)(g) is unconstitutional because it allows the government to administer involuntary medication to a prisoner without a finding of dangerousness. The court of appeals elected not to decide the issue due to mootness, but that seems like a mistake. Read more

Facebooktwitterlinkedinmail
{ 0 comments }

State v. Kavin K. Nesbit, 2016AP224-CR, 8/9/17, District 2 (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Nesbit ran out of gas on I 94. He and his buddy were walking on the shoulder, red can in hand, to get gas when Deputy Fowles pulled up and told them he’d give them a ride to and from the gas station. But first, he asked them if they had any weapons. The friend said “no.” Nesbit who had been behaving normally “‘all of a sudden’ became ‘very deflated’ and shook his head slightly in the negative.”

Read more

Facebooktwitterlinkedinmail
{ 0 comments }

State v. Derek Asunto, 2015AP50, 8/8/17, District 2 (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Derek Asunto and the state agreed to resolve several charges by dismissing some and having him plead to others. At the hearing where the deal was announced to the court, he entered a plea to one criminal count. The parties and court agreed the other counts would be held open until the sentencing hearing, but that at that hearing, Asunto would plead to an OWI-4th and the rest would be dismissed. Read more

Facebooktwitterlinkedinmail
{ 0 comments }

State v. K.J. & State v. A.W., 2016AP1501/1502 and 2017AP720/721, District 1, 8/8/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2016AP1501; 2016AP1502; 2017AP720; 2017AP721

The circuit court didn’t lose competency to terminate the parental rights of K.J. and A.W. after an initial TPR petition failed, nor did the doctrine of issue preclusion apply to the second TPR trial. Read more

Facebooktwitterlinkedinmail
{ 0 comments }

State v. J.L.B., 2016AP2358, District 4, 8/3/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court erred in finding that a six-year-old child’s videotaped interview was admissible under § 908.08 because nothing in the interview showed the child understood the importance of telling the truth and that there are negative consequences to untruthfulness. See § 908.08(3)(c)State v. Jimmie R.R., 2000 WI App 5, ¶¶40-45, 232 Wis. 2d 138, 606 N.W.2d 196. (¶¶6-10). The error was harmless, of course: At trial the child testified in person (see § 908.08(5)(a)) and repeated her allegation that J.L.B. had touched her vaginal area, and another witness provided testimony lending credibility to the child’s testimony. (¶¶14-17).

Facebooktwitterlinkedinmail
{ 0 comments }

State v. D.J.A.R., 2017AP52, District 4, 8/3/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

After D.J.A.R. was adjudicated delinquent for second degree child sexual assault under § 948.02(2), the circuit court ordered him to register as a sex offender. (¶¶4-6). It relied on § 938.34(15m)(am)1., which requires finding that the juvenile’s conduct was sexually motivated and that registration is in the interest of public protection. That was a mistake, because D.J.A.R.’s offense is governed by § 938.34(15m)(bm), which mandates registration unless the requirements of § 301.45(1m) are met. (¶¶11-14). The mistake was harmless, however. (¶15). Read more

Facebooktwitterlinkedinmail
{ 0 comments }