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Binding Authority – Mandate – Defective, Plea-Based Suppression Hearing: Vacate Plea, Notwithstanding Affirmance of Refusal to Suppress

State v. Lucian Agnello II, 2004 WI App 2, (AG’s) PFR filed 1/8/04, on appeal after remand2003 WI 44; prior history: State v. Agnello I, 226 Wis.2d 164, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999)
For Agnello: Jerome F. Buting, Pamela Moorshead

Issue: Whether the defendant is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea and to have a trial under the supreme court’s mandate in his prior appeal, which vacated his guilty plea-based conviction and remanded for a new hearing on voluntariness of his confession, ultimately resulting in affirmance of the refusal to suppress.
Holding:

¶26. To resolve this issue, we have attempted to find cases in which the supreme court vacated convictions in similar circumstances, and we have located State v. Jiles, 2003 WI 66, 262 Wis. 2d 457, 663 N.W.2d 798. Jiles involves a defendant very similarly situated to Agnello…. After deciding that Jiles’ Miranda-Goodchild hearing was inadequate, the court stated: “Jiles is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea and to be granted a new and sufficient Miranda-Goodchildhearing. After this hearing, he is entitled to a trial if he so desires.” Id., 49 (emphasis added).¶27. We find the decision in Jiles instructive on the supreme court’s intent when it vacated Agnello’s conviction. Jiles was decided just one month after the supreme court issued the order in this case vacating the certification. We therefore assume the supreme court had in mind the lack of specific directions in Agnellowhen it chose to specify that Jiles was entitled to a trial if he desired. We can discern no reason why the supreme court would treat such similarly situated parties differently. In each case the defendant entered a guilty plea after his motion to suppress his statements was denied. In each case the supreme court determined that the hearing on the motion was defective and the defendant was entitled to another hearing, and it reversed the conviction.

¶28. We therefore conclude the supreme court intended that Agnello would be entitled to a trial after the Goodchild hearing if he chose, just as the court granted Jiles that choice. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Agnello’s request for a trial and remand for trial.

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