State v. Avant Rondell Nimmer, 2020AP878-CR, petition for review granted 3/24/21; case activity (including links to briefs and PFR)
Issue presented (composed by On Point):
Did police responding to a ShotSpotter alert of shots fired have reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Nimmer based on his proximity to the address in the alert so close to the alert and Nimmer’s response to the officer’s arrival on the scene?
Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2019AP1033, petition for review granted 2/24/21; case activity
Issues for review:
1. Whether S.A.M.’s appeal from his recommitment is moot because it expired before S.A.M. filed his notice of appeal.
2. Whether the county failed to meet its burden of proving dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence.
3. Whether S.A.M. was denied procedural due process because the county failed to provide particularized notice of the basis for his recommitment. including which standard of dangerousness was being alleged.
4. Whether this court has the authority, through its “superintending and administrative authority over all courts” (Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(1)) and/or its authority to “regulate pleading, practice, and procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts” (Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1)), to require the court of appeals to expedite the disposition of appeals under Wis. Stat. ch. 51, or in some other manner to ensure that appellants under Wis. Stat. ch. 51 receive an appeal that addresses the merits of the appellants’ contentions?*
Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2020AP370, petition for review granted 2/26/21; case activity
Issue for review:
Section 51.20(11) provides that the subject of a commitment proceeding must demand a jury trial 48 hours in advance of the time set for the final hearing. When the court adjourns the hearing for good cause to appoint new counsel, does that reset the 48 hours for demanding a jury trial? [continue reading…]
State v. Ryan Hugh Mulhern, 2019AP1565-CR, petition to review granted 1/20/21; case activity (including PFR and briefs)
Issue presented (from the state’s PFR)
Does § 972.11(2)(b), the “rape shield” statute, bar relevant evidence of the complainant’s lack of sexual conduct when the state offers the evidence to corroborate the complainant’s allegation of sexual assault and the evidence is not prejudicial to the complainant or the defendant and causes none of the harms the rape shield law is intended to protect against? [continue reading…]
State v. Manuel Garcia, 2018AP2319-CR, petition for review granted 1/20/21; case activity
Issue for review: (adapted from the State’s PFR and the COA’s opinion):
Whether the State may invoke the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule during its case-in-chief and thereby use a defendant’s statement, taken in violation of Miranda, to rehabilitate one of its witnesses?
State v. Cesar Antonio Lira, 2019AO691-CR, petition for review granted 1/20/21; case activity
Issues presented (from the State’s PFR):
1. Under §973.155, a convicted offender is entitled to sentence credit for “all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed.” And §973.15(5) provides that an offender lawfully made available to another jurisdiction is entitled to credit for custody time in that jurisdiction “under the terms of s. 973.155.”
The court of appeals awarded Lira over 11 years of credit for custody in Oklahoma under §973.15(5), despite the fact that the Oklahoma sentence was not “in connection with” the Wisconsin offenses for which he was sentenced. It relied on State v. Brown, 2006 WI App 41, 289 Wis. 2d 823, 711 N.W.2d 708, which holds that courts determining credit under section 973.15(5) may not consider “the terms of s. 973.155,” including whether the custody in the other jurisdiction is “in connection with” the Wisconsin offense.
State v. Octavia W. Dodson, 2018AP1476-CR, petition for review granted 1/20/21; case activity (including briefs)
Did the sentencing court violate Dodson’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms by considering his status as a lawful gun owner an aggravating factor at sentencing?
State v. Anthony M. Schmidt, 2020AP616-CR, petition for bypass granted 12/28/20; case activity
- Does Wis. Stat. §973.042 (the child pornography surcharge statute) permit the circuit court to impose a child pornography surcharge for an offense that is “read in” for sentencing purposes?
- Is the child pornography surcharge a punishment that must be explained during a plea colloquy? If so, was Schmidt entitled to a hearing on his claim that the plea colloquy was deficient in this case?