During a post-polygraph interview, police repeatedly referenced Vice’s polygraph test results and failed to inform him that the results would be inadmissible in court. Did the court of appeals give undue weight to these factors in assessing the voluntariness of Vice’s confession to sexual assault of a four year old?
Whether an appeal from a Wis. Stat. §51.20(1)(am) recommitment order may properly be dismissed as moot.
Whether the County met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. R. was currently dangerous as required by Wis. Stat. §51.20(1)(am).
- Did the circuit court lose competency to conduct a recommitment hearing because the County did not file the evaluation of K.E.K. at least 21 days before the expiration of her commitment, as required by § 51.20(13)(g)2r.?
- Is the recommitment standard in § 51.20(1)(am) facially unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment because it violates the guarantees of substantive due process and equal protection of the law or abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens?
- Is the recommitment standard in § 51.20(1)(am) unconstitutional as applied to K.E.K.?
Usually we do to the issues presented first. Here, they’re pretty insubstantial, so let’s just say what’s going on: the supreme court has intervened to (potentially) save a manifestly unconstitutional (and you don’t have to take our word for it) homicide conviction and life sentence in a notorious case. Read more
Issue (from the State’s petition for review):
It is well established that a DOT record is competent proof of a defendant’s prior conviction and can therefore be used to enhance the defendant’s sentence. It is also well established that a defendant may challenge the existence of a conviction listed on a DOT record. But currently, there is no accepted procedure for how a defendant should challenge the existence of a conviction listed in a DOT record and what burden he must satisfy to make a DOT record so unreliable that it no longer qualifies as competent proof of the conviction.
Do the lack of a judgment of conviction for a prior offense and other documents that “support the inference” that the conviction does not exist render a Wisconsin DOT driving record that lists the conviction so unreliable that it is no longer competent proof of the conviction? Read more
Issues (from the State’s petition for review):
1. Did the court of appeals contravene §901.03(1)(a) when it directly reviewed Mercado’s forfeited challenges to the admission of the victims’ forensic interview videos into evidence?
2. Did the circuit court court properly admit the victims’ forensic interview videos into evidence at trial?
Issues (adapted from the State’s petition for review):
1. Under Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), when a defendant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a guilty plea, he must prove that but for his lawyer’s deficient performance he would have proceeded to trial. More recently, Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) held that a defendant can, in some circumstances, prove Strickland prejudice even without a reasonable probability of success at trial. Given the facts of this case, did Savage prove that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea even though he couldn’t show a reasonable probability of success at trial?
2. State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89 holds that a court cannot decide an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if a Machner hearing has not occurred. In Savage’s case, the circuit court did conduct a Machner hearing, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded on both deficient performance and prejudice because the circuit court misapplied State v. Dinkins, 2012 WI 24, ¶ 5, 339 Wis. 2d 78, 810 N.W.2d 787. Should the court of appeals have affirmed under the rule that the court of appeals may sustain a circuit court decision if there are facts in the record to support it?
- To prove that a person meets the criteria for commitment under Chapter 980, must the state present expert opinion testimony that the person is “dangerous” as defined under ch. 980?
- Should the standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence of dangerousness in a Chapter 980 case be changed to require that a reviewing court conduct a de novo review of whether the evidence satisfies the legal standard of dangerousness?