Issue: Whether CCAP entries can satisfy the State’s burden of proving a repeater allegation.
Holding: Although the rules of evidence do not apply to proof of a repeater and a prior conviction need not be proved by certification,
(¶46) a CCAP report, by its own terms, is of questionable accuracy. It is not the official record of a criminal case, as the clerks of court for each county are the officials responsible for those records. Wis. Stat. § 59.40(2)(c). And, a CCAP report is not a copy of the actual judgment of conviction. Yet, it was offered to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Bonds was convicted of felony forgery on a particular date. The disclaimer with which a CCAP report is conditioned causes us to have reasonable doubt about its accuracy.
¶49 Accordingly, we are persuaded that the reasoning of Saunders cannot be analogously applied to a CCAP report. CCAP records are not like uncertified copies of judgments in that CCAP reports do not purport to be identical to the court records, as photocopies do. The agreement to which all CCAP users are asked to adhere specifically warns that CCAP provides no warranty of accuracy for the data in its reports. We cannot, under those circumstances, consider the contents of a CCAP report to rise to the level of reliability sufficient to establish prima facie proof that a defendant has a prior qualifying conviction. In addition, Bonds did not stipulate to using a CCAP report as the “mode of proof” for habitual criminality.  He asserted before the circuit court that the State had not proved habitual criminality beyond a reasonable doubt; he has continued to do so throughout the appellate process. Therefore, we conclude that by relying solely  on the CCAP report, and without other evidence that could prove Bonds’s repeater status beyond a reasonable doubt, the State did not offer sufficient evidence to constitute prima facie proof that Bonds was an habitual criminal. Accordingly, the State did not meet its burden to prove habitual criminality.
 The concurrence/dissent is incorrect to assert that the repeater allegation is proved because of Bonds’s “admission” in regard to a qualifying conviction. Concurrence/Dissent, ¶111. Although we do not agree that Bonds admitted a prior felony conviction, we point out that in order for a defendant to admit a prior conviction for purposes of proving habitual criminality, the defendant’s admission must contain specific reference to the date of the conviction and any period of incarceration. State v. Zimmerman, 185 Wis. 2d 549, 557, 518 N.W.2d 303 (Ct. App. 1994). Bonds made no statement that could establish the date of a prior felony conviction.
 We do not exclude the use of a CCAP report as a tool to facilitate a review with the defendant at sentencing of defendant’s past history of criminal convictions.