The 120-day deadline for trying a case under the Intrastate Detainer Act, § 971.11(2), is explicitly “subject to” the speedy trial statute, § 971.10; thus, the Intrastate Detainer Act incorporates the provision of the speedy trial statute that allows for continuances for good cause, § 971.10(3)(a), and those continuances may go beyond the 120-day deadline.
¶7 Butler argues that Wis. Stat. § 971.11(2) simply requires the State to abide by a speedy trial demand when there is also a prompt disposition request. He argues a continuance beyond the 120-day period is never permitted under the Intrastate Detainer Act. We reject Butler’s conclusion. Butler’s theory does not comport with the specific conclusion by the [State v.] Davis[, 2001 WI 136, 248 Wis. 2d 986, 637 N.W.2d 62] and [State v.] Adams[, 207 Wis. 2d 568, 558 N.W.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1996)] courts that the “subject to [Wis. Stat. §] 971.10” language following the 120-day time period in § 971.11(2) refers to the court’s authority to grant a continuance for the reasons specified in § 971.10(3)(a). Indeed, Butler’s conclusion that the 120-day time period set forth in § 971.11(2) cannot be extended is fundamentally inconsistent with the Davis court’s conclusion that failure to bring a case to trial within 120 days triggers dismissal, which can be without prejudice and therefore allow for refiling. Davis squarely rejected the hard deadline Butler promotes. Whether a good faith extension is granted before the trial, with a continuance, or after the State fails to bring the case on for trial within 120 days, with a dismissal without prejudice where good cause is shown, the concept is the same and is allowed under the statute.
Butler had demanded both a speedy trial under § 971.10 and a prompt disposition under the Intrastate Detainer Act. (¶2). When the circuit court continued the trial to a date past the 120-day Detainer Act deadline it considered the factors in the speedy trial statute, § 971.10(3)(b), but did not explicitly address Butler’s demand for a prompt disposition. (¶10). No matter, since the Detainer Act incorporates the speedy trial statute’s good-cause standard:
¶11 The circuit court articulated the reasons for the continuance based on the factors set forth in the Speedy Trial Statute. The “subject to” language in Wis. Stat. § 971.11(2) of the Intrastate Detainer Act incorporates a good cause continuance under Wis. Stat. § 971.10(3)(a) of the Speedy Trial Statute. While the circuit court did not explicitly address Butler’s intrastate detainer request, we see no harm, as the request and its attendant time limit were subject to the speedy trial grounds and authorization for a continuance. The circuit court addressed the statutory factors, applied them to the facts of this case, and reached a well-reasoned decision to allow a continuance. We will not overturn this appropriate exercise of discretion.