Juan Smith v. Cain, USSC No. 10-8145, 1/10/12
Statements by the sole eyewitness, who identified Smith at trial as one of the perpetrators, that in fact he couldn’t see the faces of the perpetrators were “material” to determination of Smith’s guilt. Therefore, the state’s failure to disclose these statements before trial violated Smith’s due process right to exculpatory evidence.
Under Brady, the State violates a defendant’s right to due process if it withholds evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment. See 373 U. S., at 87. The State does not dispute that Boatner’s statements in Ronquillo’s notes were favorable to Smith and that those statements were not disclosed to him. The sole question before us is thus whether Boatner’s statements were material to the determination of Smith’s guilt. We have explained that “evidence is `material’ within the meaning ofBrady when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Cone v. Bell, 556 U. S. 449, 469-470 (2009). A reasonable probability does not mean that the defendant “would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence,” only that the likelihood of a different result is great enough to “undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 434 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We have observed that evidence impeaching an eyewitness may not be material if the State’s other evidence is strong enough to sustain confidence in the verdict. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97,112-113, and n. 21 (1976). That is not the case here. Boatner’s testimony was the only evidence linking Smith to the crime. And Boatner’s undisclosed statements directly contradict his testimony: Boatner told the jury that he had “[n]o doubt” that Smith was the gunman he stood “face to face” with on the night of the crime, but Ronquillo’s notes show Boatner saying that he “could not ID anyone because [he] couldn’t see faces” and “would not know them if [he] saw them.” App. 196, 200, 308. Boatner’s undisclosed statements were plainly material.