Issue: Whether admission of other acts evidence was an erroneous exercise of discretion.
¶5 … In a written decision, the trial court properly applied the Sullivan three-step analysis:
The acts which took place some years ago are remarkably similar to the allegations before the Court in this case … [and the] evidence does tend to make the consequential fact or proposition more probable than it would be without it. It further can be relevant if used in regard to credibility of the child witness.
Finally, as to the probative value, the Court does not believe it is outweighed by undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading of the jury or by considerations of undue delay waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
While these other acts may be chronologically old, they are very similar in nature.
The trial court did not err in deciding that [t]he probative value in this case outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. We hold that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the other acts evidence.