State v. Terrill J. Hintz, 2007 WI App 113, (AG’s) PFR granted 9/11/07
For Hintz: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: Where an extended supervision hold is based at least in part on arrest on a new offense, § 973.115(1)(a) awards credit for time spent in custody under the hold against the sentence ultimately imposed for conviction of that offense.
Note that it does not matter that a signature bond was issued for the new offense:
¶11 Finally, the State argues that Hintz was not in custody in connection with the burglary because he was released on signature bond with respect to charges in that matter during the disputed time period. Thus, the State argues, Hintz was in custody solely for the extended supervision hold, which was based on his original OMVWI conviction. However, just because a judicial officer released Hintz on a signature bond does not mean that Hintz’s agent could not take the alleged behavior into account when placing the hold. Thus, we conclude that our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) as allowing sentence credit for time in custody that is in part due to the conduct resulting in the new conviction resolves this issue.
The court also reminds that credit accrues up to, not after, reconfinement, ¶7 n. 3:
Hintz concedes that after he was sentenced on July 19, 2004, following his extended supervision revocation, any connection between his custody and the new crime was severed. ” See State v. Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 372, 379, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985). Hintz therefore seeks sentence credit only until his reconfinement on his OMVWI conviction.
Keep in mind, though, that Beets is probably limited to its factual context, State v. Martin V. Yanick, Jr.,, 2007 WI App 30, ¶22:
¶22 To the extent the State is suggesting that Beets holds that service of a sentence on crime A always “severs” time in custody owing to crime B for purposes of awarding sentence credit on the sentence for crime B, we disagree. Beets addressed a particular type of status—time in custody serving a sentence and awaiting disposition on a separate crime. Beets does not address service of a sentence and concurrent service of custody time pursuant to a disposition, which is the sort of concurrent custody time at issue here.
And compare, State v. Lee Terrence Presley, 2006 WI App 82, ¶13 (further limiting Beets, in the sense that mere fact of revocation isn’t enough to sever connection; instead, reconfinement must be imposed: “an offender who has had his or her extended supervision revoked is entitled to sentence credit on any new charges until the trial court ‘resentences’ him or her from the available remaining term of extended supervision”).