State v. Jose A. Trujillo, 2005 WI 45, affirming summary order of court of appeals
For Trujillo: Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate
¶13 We define a new factor as “an event or development which frustrates the purpose of the original sentence,” Champion, 258 Wis. 2d 781, ¶4, and recognize it to be more than a change in circumstances since the time of sentencing. Crochiere, 273 Wis. 2d 57, ¶14. … As previously noted, to qualify for a sentence modification based on a new factor, the defendant must show: (1) a new factor exists; and (2) the new factor warrants modification of his sentence. State v. Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 434 N.W.2d 609 (1989).
¶14 Case law governing sentence modification based on a new factor is well settled. Champion, 258 Wis. 2d 781, ¶4. Wisconsin courts have reached the conclusion that many of the circumstances presented were not sufficient to establish a new factor.  See Crochiere, 273 Wis. 2d 57, ¶15. While there have been some cases where new factors have been identified,  there have been no cases involving TIS legislation where the reduction in penalties has been considered highly relevant to the imposition of sentence and, thus, a new factor.
The footnotes in this text aren’t reproduced here, just their links; what you’ll see is a dreary recitation of what have not, followed by a perversely illuminating list of what have been found to be a “new factor.” The former utterly dwarf the latter, which grandly total three in number; and of those lonely three examples, one is an instance of an increase in sentence, while the other two can equally be explained as accurate-information cases. That said, you must also throw into the mix State v. John Doe, 2005 WI App 68 (cooperation with law enforcement is a new factor), which, if it doesn’t turn out to be one-off, makes hazardous generalization about new-factor based argument.