court of appeals decision; for Pickens: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate
Reasonable Suspicion for Detention and “Collective Knowledge” Doctrine
Although, “under the collective knowledge doctrine, an investigating officer with knowledge of facts amounting to reasonable suspicion may direct a second officer without such knowledge to stop and detain a suspect,” the state must prove those underlying facts. “Proof is not supplied by the mere testimony of one officer that he relied on the unspecified knowledge of another officer,” ¶¶12-13.
¶16 We glean from Terry, Johnson, and Hensley that, when a court assesses the reasonableness of a temporary detention, it may not consider the bare fact that investigating officers know that other officers suspect an individual of involvement in prior criminal behavior because such evidence does not provide specific, articulable facts to which the court can apply the reasonable suspicion standard.
Duration and Intensity of Detention; Handcuffed, Placed in Squad Absent Suspected Weapons
A temporary detention is narrowly circumscribed, in terms of duration and intensity, by the least intrusive means necessary to dispel suspicion, ¶27. Thus, in the absence of any reason to believe weapons were present, use of handcuffs on Griffin was unjustified, ¶30.
¶33 In sum, we conclude that the State failed to show that the level of restraint used to detain Pickens was reasonable because the State points to no specific, articulable facts that justify handcuffing and securing Pickens in a squad car. In the absence of any other developed argument supporting admission of evidence obtained from Pickens in the parking lot, we conclude that that evidence must be suppressed. 
Court observes that “(a) number of courts have concluded that police exceeded the permissible scope of a temporary detention in circumstances that we find at least as compelling as those here,” and proceeds to catalog them, ¶33 n. 5. Import: long-delayed recognition that handcuffing/squad placement may well convert stop into full-blown arrest. See, e.g., discussion here (following Marten-Hoye summary); and here (scroll under Neaves summary).
The court declines to definitively resolve whether suspected drug activity alone justifies handcuffing, but cautions “that our research indicates that we would likely reject such an argument,” ¶31.
Consent to Search and Apparent Authority, Hotel Guest
An individual with apparent common authority over premises may consent to their search. Thus, someone in a hotel room, who said she was staying in the room with the person who had the key and who appeared to have been sleeping when the police went to the room, had apparent shared authority over the room so as to support her consent to search the room, ¶¶39-42.
Consent to Search and Apparent Authority, Hotel Guest and Locked Safe
Though a hotel room occupant had apparent authority to consent to a search of the room, she had neither actual nor apparent authority to consent to search of a locked safe within the room, ¶¶44-47.
Cases involving “implied consent” to search containers within area to which consent to search has been given, distinguished in that issue here is scope of authority, not scope of consent, ¶¶45-46.
¶1 The State’s inevitable discovery argument is simple: because, by the time police illegally searched the safe, they had enough information to obtain a search warrant for the safe, it follows that the police would have inevitably acquired a warrant and legally obtained the contents of the safe. The State does not, however, explain how its theory satisfies the requirement that police be actively pursuing the legal alternative—here, a warrant—prior to the unlawful search. See State v. Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d 413, 427-28, 559 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1996) (the inevitable discovery doctrine includes the requirement that “prior to the unlawful search the government … was actively pursuing some alternate line of investigation”). If the existence of probable cause for a warrant excused the failure to obtain a warrant, the protection afforded by the warrant requirement would be much diminished. See United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205-06 (5th Cir. 1985) (explaining that application of the inevitable discovery doctrine, where agents “could have obtained a warrant but had made no effort to do so,” undercuts the warrant requirement).