State v. Antonion Blanco, Nora M. Al-Shammari, 2000 WI App 119, 237 Wis.2d 395, 614 N.W.2d 512
For Blanco: Michael P. Jakus
Issue: Whether an arrest warrant provided authority for the police to enter the residence of a third party and arrest the person named in the warrant.
¶10 An arrest warrant authorizes the police to “enter the suspect’s residence to execute the warrant if there is reason to believe he will be found there; the officer does not need a search warrant.” United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980)). The question raised in the instant case, however, is whether the police had reason to believe that Blanco was residing in the Al-Shammari apartment. If so, this case is governed by Payton; if not, resolution rests on another line of cases, including Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) and State v. Kiper, 193 Wis. 2d 69, 532 N.W.2d 698 (1995).
¶11 Payton authorizes police entry to a home if they have probable cause to believe that the person named in the arrest warrant lives there and is present within. See id., 445 U.S. at 576….
¶12 Payton has been construed to mean that police may enter the home of a person named in an arrest warrant, if the person resides there, even though third persons also reside there. …
¶13 The other line of cases suggests that an arrest warrant is insufficient to enter a third party’s home, even if the police believe that the subject of the arrest warrant is present there….
¶15 … We agree with the reasoning espoused in Valdez. The dispositive issue then becomes whether the police have reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect of the search warrant was residing in the third party’s home, or whether the information known to the police suggests merely that the suspect was visiting the third party’s home….
The court goes on to hold that the police had enough information to support entry of Al-Shammari’s residence under authority of an arrest warrant for Blanco, based on a confirmed tip that Blanco was “staying” at the residence, along with information that he’d gone inside shortly before. On the generally applicable principles also see O’Rourke v. Hayes, 11th Cir. No. 03-10795, 7/27/04 (“The arrest warrant would have been sufficient to allow Hayes to enter Brown’s home if he had reason to believe that Brown was there. … It was clearly insufficient, however, to authorize him to enter the premises of any third party, even if he believed Brown might be there. … These considerations apply not only in homes, but in any places where a third party has a reasonable expectation of privacy.”).But see: U.S. v. Hardin, 6th Cir No. 06-6277, 8/25/08 (not clear whether Steagald requires probable cause or lesser standard of “reason to believe,” and leaving question open).