City of Waukesha v. Derek R. Pike, 2016AP1720, 3/1/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A police officer stopped Pike at 1:00 a.m. because his car lacked a front license plate. The officer smelled alcohol, and Pike admitted that he was coming from a nightclub where he had consumed 1 or 2 beers. The officer conducted FSTs, and the results caused him to request blood chemical tests, which Pike refused. [continue reading…]
Buck v. Davis, USSC No. 15-8049, 2017 WL 685534 (February 22, 2017), reversing and remanding Buck v. Stephens, 623 Fed. Appx. 668 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Buck was found guilty of capital murder. Under state law, the jury could impose a death sentence only if it found Buck was likely to commit acts of violence in the future. At sentencing Buck’s attorney called Walter Quijano, a psychologist, to give an opinion on that issue. Though the psychologist testified Buck probably would not engage in violent conduct, he also said that race is one factor in assessing a person’s propensity for violence and that Buck was statistically more likely to act violently because he is black. The jury sentenced Buck to death. The Supreme Court, by a 7-to-2 vote, holds Buck’s attorney was ineffective. [continue reading…]
Did the Supreme Court’s decision in Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011), silently abrogate the presumption set forth in Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991)—that a federal court sitting in habeas proceedings should “look through” a summary state court ruling to review the last reasoned decision—as a slim majority of the en banc Eleventh Circuit held in this case, despite the agreement of both parties that the Ylst presumption should continue to apply?
Marathon County v. R.O., 2016AP1898-FT, 2/27/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
In 2016 R.O. was detained under § 51.15 after she was evicted and went to a local shelter but wasn’t able to do the paperwork to stay at the shelter. According to the two doctors who examined her while she was under emergency detention, R.O. was angry, defiant, irritable, displayed some paranoia, refused to cooperate with certain parts of the exams, and ‘lacked insight” into her illness. (¶¶2-6). These observations, in conjunction with information in her records describing past episodes that ended in hospitalization, were sufficient to justify the circuit court’s finding she was dangerous to herself. [continue reading…]
Voces de La Frontera, Inc. v. David A Clarke, Jr., 2017 WI 16, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2/24/107; case activity (including briefs)
Voces filed an open records request for immigration detainer forms (aka I-247 forms) for persons held at the Milwaukee County Jail. It wanted to confirm that Sheriff Clarke was following federal law governing the deportation of immigrants. See Journal Sentinel story. When Clarke provided only redacted forms, Voces sued for full disclosure and won at the circuit court and the court of appeals. SCOW now reverses in a decision the dissent calls a loss for the people of Wisconsin and their longstanding commitment to open government. [continue reading…]
State v. Tabitha A. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, affirming a published court of appeals decision; 2014AP2981-CR, 2/23/2017; case activity (including briefs)
On June 30, 2013, Wisconsin enacted its biennial budget bill. Among its provisions were changes to the DNA surcharge applied to criminal convictions in Wisconsin. The $250 surcharge became mandatory rather than discretionary for all felonies (rather than just a few as previously), and would now be applied on a per-count basis rather than once per case. The bill also created a new, mandatory $200-per-count surcharge for misdemeanors. [continue reading…]
State v. Ricky C. Anderson, 2017 WI App 17; case activity (including briefs)
Ricky Anderson pled to a sexual assault by telephone from prison, with his attorney, the prosecutor and the judge all in the courtroom. The court of appeals concludes the court did not do enough to establish either that Anderson knowingly waived his statutory right to be physically present or that the telephone connection was adequate to allow his meaningful participation in the hearing.
In case you have not heard, the ACLU has filed Collins v. City of Milwaukee, a class action lawsuit alleging that the Milwaukee Police Department’s stop-and-frisk program uses racial profiling. Click here to read the complaint. According the ACLU’s press release:
In 2011, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel found that Milwaukee police were seven times more likely to stop Black drivers than white drivers, and five times more likely to stop Hispanic drivers than white drivers. According to the ACLU’s preliminary analysis of records from a Milwaukee police database on stops, Black (non-Hispanic) people were the targets of 72% of stops from 2010 through 2012 when they made up 34% of the city’s population . . .
Collins v. Milwaukee seeks an end to the Milwaukee Police Department’s practice of conducting stops and frisks without reasonable suspicion, as well as its practice of stopping people based on their race or ethnicity. It also seeks reforms that safeguard constitutional rights by promoting bias-free and evidence-based policing, transparency, and police accountability. These reforms include improved training, supervision, and monitoring of officers who conduct stops and frisks, and the collection and semiannual release to the public of data on all stops and frisks to permit further analysis for evidence of constitutional violations.
