County of Grant v. Daniel A. Vogt, 2014 WI 76, 7/18/14, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity
“Although we acknowledge that this is a close case, we conclude that a law enforcement officer’s knock on a car window does not by itself constitute a show of authority sufficient to give rise to the belief in a reasonable person that the person is not free to leave.” (¶3).
State v. Craig C. Meier, 2013AP2863-CR, District 4, 7/17/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The answer matters: If the pronouncement of sentence is ambiguous the court could “clarify[] and “reimpose[]” the sentences it originally intended, Krueger v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 435, 442-43, 272 N.W.2d 847 (1979); if the sentence is illegal, it must be commuted to the lawful maximum, § 973.13. In this case the court of appeals holds the circuit court’s initial pronouncement of sentences in this case was ambiguous, so it affirms the circuit court’s “correction” of the sentences to reflect the sentences the court intended to impose.
Green County DHS v. Ericka L.R., 2014AP1106, District 4, 7/17/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Assuming the “fair and just reason” standard for plea withdrawal before sentencing also applies to motions to withdraw consent to TPR before disposition, Ericka failed to establish a fair and just reason for withdrawing her voluntary consent to termination of her rights to her daughter.
State v. Daniel D. Bolstad, 2013AP2139, District 4, 7/17/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
The court of appeals orders a new trial in the interest of justice because the prosecutor’s unwitting use of false testimony as critical evidence to establish that Bolstad was lying so clouded the crucial issue of credibility that it prevented the real controversy from being fully tried.
State v. Vernon D. Hershberger, 2014 WI App 86; case activity
As a general rule, a person may not collaterally attack a prior judicial order or judgment in a proceeding brought to enforce that order or judgment, e.g., State v. Campbell, 2006 WI 99, ¶¶51-55, 294 Wis. 2d 100, 718 N.W.2d 649. The court of appeals holds this rule also applies to proceedings brought to enforce an administrative order.
State v. Angelica Nelson, 2014 WI 70, 7/16/14, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority decision by Justice Roggensack; case activity
Nelson wanted to testify at her trial on child sexual assault charges, but after a colloquy with her about waiving her right to remain silent the trial judge wouldn’t let her because he concluded she was testifying against counsel’s advice and her testimony was “completely irrelevant” to the elements the State had to prove. (¶¶14-16). The supreme court assumes without deciding that the trial judge erred, but it follows the majority of jurisdictions in holding that erroneous denial of a defendant’s right to testify is subject to harmless error analysis because its effect on the outcome of the trial is capable of assessment.
State v. Antonio D. Brown, 2014 WI 69, 7/16/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Bradley; case activity
Another defense victory! Police stopped Brown’s car due to an alleged violation of §347.13(1), which prohibits the operation of a vehicle at night unless its tail lamps are in “good working order.” In a 4-3 decision, the majority holds that the police here misunderstood the statute, so the stop was illegal. Furthermore, a stop based upon an officer’s mistake of law, is unlawful, and the results of the ensuing search must be suppressed. Justice Prosser, dissenting, predicts the majority’s interpretation will be “a bonanza for litigants seeking to challenge motor vehicle stops.” ¶79.
Kenosha County v. Vermetrias W., 2014AP861-FT, District 2, 7/16/14 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Vermetrias had been the subject of a Chapter 51 commitment order, which Kenosha County sought to extend. Section 51.20(1)(a)2 provides than an individual is the proper subject for commitment if he or she poses a danger to himself or herself or to others. Vermetrias presented evidence that there was not a “substantial likelihood” she would become dangerous if her commitment ended. The trial court ruled against her. The court of appeals affirmed, but complimented those involved in this matter:
