by admin
on June 19, 2014
State v. Russell S. Krancki, 2014 WI App 80; case activity
In the first Wisconsin case to address how Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013), affects the admission of evidence of a defendant’s silence, the court of appeals reads Salinas to apply to a narrow factual scenario not present in this case. The court goes on to assume that trial counsel should have objected to testimony about Krancki’s silence, but finds his failure to object wasn’t prejudicial. The court also concludes trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for saying in his opening statement that Krancki would testify or for failing to exclude references to the .02 blood alcohol limit.
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by admin
on June 19, 2014
State v. Dale F. Wendt, 2014AP174, District 2, 6/18/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The information known to the deputy at the time he requested Wendt to take a blood test provided probable cause to believe Wendt had driven his vehicle while intoxicated earlier that evening, despite the deputy’s lack of information as to whether Wendt drank during the time that lapsed between his driving and his contact with the deputy.
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by admin
on June 19, 2014
State v. David Phillip Foley, 2013AP1722-CR/2013AP1723-CR; district 1, 6/17/14 (unpublished); case activity
Under § 943.20(1)(d), theft by fraud requires, among other things, that the defendant made a false representation to the owner of the property that the defendant stole. This does not require direct communication between the defendant and the victim. It is sufficient that the defendant made a statement to a third party with the intent or reasonable expectation that it would be communicated to the victim.
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by admin
on June 19, 2014
State v. Jesse J. Franklin, Jr., 2013AP1447, District 1, 6/17/14 (unpublished); case activity
Milwaukee Police Officers Paul Lough and James Campbell testified against Franklin at his trial for possession of marijuana and cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of a firearm by a felon. Franklin was convicted and lost his appeal. A few years later he filed a § 974.06 motion arguing that he should be granted a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence–namely evidence that Officers Campbell and Lough had beaten, planted evidence on, and falsely arrested 6 individuals during the same period in which they arrested Franklin. Franklin argued that this evidence supported his defense that someone else had placed in his van the drugs and guns that the police found there.
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by admin
on June 17, 2014
State ex re. Lorenzo D. Kyles v. William Pollard, 2013 WI 38, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity
Settling a somewhat obscure but still important point of appellate procedure, the supreme court unanimously holds that when a defendant seeks to reinstate the deadline for filing a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief under § 809.30(2)(b) based on an allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely notice, he should file a habeas petition in the court of appeals as provided under State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992).
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by admin
on June 16, 2014
Questions presented
Whether, consistent with the First Amendment and Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), conviction of threatening another person requires proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten, as required by the Ninth Circuit and the supreme courts of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont; or whether it is enough to show that a “reasonable person” would regard the statement as threatening, as held by other federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort.
Whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, conviction of threatening another person under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten.
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by admin
on June 16, 2014
Abramski v. United States, USSC No. 12-1493, 2014 WL 2676779 (June 16, 2014), affirming United States v. Abramski, 706 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
Resolving a split between federal circuit courts of appeal, the Supreme Court holds that the prohibition in 18 U. S. C. § 922(a)(6) against making false statements about “any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale” of a firearm applies to a “straw” purchaser—a person who buys a gun on someone else’s behalf while falsely claiming that it is for himself—even if the true buyer could have purchased the gun legally.
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by admin
on June 13, 2014
How about some light reading and watching for your Friday afternoon?
Do you like the “Happy” song? You know: “Clap along if you feel like a room without a roof!” [Chorus: “because I’m happy . . .”] Well, apparently there’s a law firm just brimming with happy lawyers and they’ve videotaped themselves getting down to the Happy song. You can watch them boogie here. On Point’s pretty sure public defenders have a better sense of rhythm!
That sneaky SCOTUS. Did you know that SCOTUS surreptitiously changes its opinions long after it issues them? Adam Liptak of the New York Times wrote about it here. The edits aren’t trivial. Just as interesting, a techie lawyer figured out a way to detect and tweet those changes so you don’t have to do side-by-side comparisons of the original decision and the one you might be reading years later. Read about it here. Anybody know whether SCOW surreptitiously edits opinions?
SCOTUS v. Rappers. Who has a bigger vocabulary? Find out here. Then ask yourself who makes more sense?!
Is forensic science really “science”? Okay, we have to have one serious link. Find out how under-trained lab workers are handling your client’s DNA here. It won’t leave you singing the “Happy” song that’s for sure.
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