State v. Peter J. Long, 2024AP1249-CR, 5/28/25, District II (not recommended for publication); case activity
While Long’s appeal presents some superficially interesting legal issues, ultimately COA’s dereference to the circuit court’s underlying factual findings govern the outcome here.
“Alice,” called police to report that her mother was being physically attacked by the defendant, Long. (¶2). Officers arrived, knocked on the front door, and received no response. (¶3). Officers walked to the rear of the home and saw two juveniles through the patio door. (Id.). Although there was a factual dispute as to the exact chain of events which followed, the circuit court made a factual finding that one of the children unlocked the door. (¶4). Although an officer asked that child to come outside, the child stated “they’re hiding in the room with us” and walked back into the residence. (Id.). The officer understood that child to be inviting him into the home. (Id.). Officers then arrested Long for disorderly conduct. (¶6).
Long filed a motion to suppress, alleging “that the officers’ entry into his home was unlawful and violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful search and seizure.” (¶7). The motion was denied and Long appeals.
“The threshold question presented by this appeal is whether Alice [the juvenile] actually consented to officers’ entry into Long’s residence.” (¶15). Here, the standard of review is against Long. Reviewing the testimony from the suppression hearing, COA concludes that the “court’s determination that Alice gave consent for officers to enter the residence was not clearly erroneous and was supported by facts in the record.” (¶16).
This leads into a more difficult legal question–whether “Alice had apparent authority to consent to entry into Long’s residence.” (¶17). Long draws COA’s attention to SCOW’s decision in State v. Tomlinson, relied on by the circuit court in this matter, and argues that his situation is distinguishable for several reasons including the young age of the child who allegedly gave consent in this case (she was 10 years old). (Id.).
However, COA is ultimately able to duck the issue of apparent consent by relying on exigent circumstances. (Id.). Here, once officers were told that the residents were “hiding” inside the house, after having been dispatched for a report of a physical altercation, they reasonably chose to disregard the warrant requirement to assure the safety of the persons inside. (¶19).
Finally, COA also addresses two related claims. First, it holds that the circuit court did not err when it allowed the State to submit an unredacted copy of the body camera footage, even though that footage was not played at the suppression hearing. (¶20). Long had introduced a redacted version of that video, which blurred the face of the child at issue. (¶22). Under these circumstances, it was not improper for the court to receive an unredacted version to make more accurate factual findings. (¶22). Moreover, the court did not err in denying Long’s motion for reconsideration because, as COA has already concluded, the underlying suppression motion was correctly decided. (¶23).
