State v. C.J.L., 2024AP1917, 7/3/25, District IV (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
C.J.L. contests part of the restitution ordered in his juvenile case related to a theft and break in at a dance studio–restitution for a surveillance subscription purchased after the theft, and for damages to the studio’s dance floor. Because the juvenile statute, Wis. Stat. § 938.34(5)(a), permits restitution for physical injury to a person or damage to property only, the COA agrees with C.J.L. and reverses the restitution order.
After the studio owner reported the theft, police received a tip that C.J.L. had the studio’s stolen speaker. C.J.L. confessed and returned the speaker to police. (¶2). He later entered a no-contest plea to theft. (¶3). The owner testified at a restitution hearing at which she sought restitution for a one-year paid subscription to a surveillance service that would record the feed from her security camera and permit her to access the recordings later, and for gouge mars and a smiley face scratched into the floor that she noticed when she cleaned the floor a few months after the theft. (¶¶4-8).
The circuit court found the owner’s testimony credible, and found “a causal nexus between the crime that was adjudicated in this case and the conduct of the crime and the damage that was done” based on “a preponderance of the evidence.” It ordered him to pay for replacement of the damaged floor as well as one year’s subscription to the surveillance service. (¶9). C.J.L. appealed the restitution order. While his appeal was pending, he completed his supervision. (¶10).
COA first addresses mootness, as C.J.L.’s order terminated when he turned 18. (¶11). Because C.J.L. might have overpaid, the appeal can have a “practical effect” and is therefore not moot. (¶12).
In a juvenile proceeding, whether the circuit court had the authority to include a particular item in a restitution order is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo, while the court’s determination of the amount of restitution is reviewed for an erroneous exercise of discretion. (¶13).
“The juvenile restitution statute provides, in relevant part, that ‘if the juvenile is found to have committed a delinquent act that resulted in damage to the property of another, or actual physical injury to another excluding pain and suffering,’ then the court may ‘order the juvenile to repair the damage to property or to make reasonable restitution for the damage or injury, either in the form of cash payments or, if the victim agrees, the performance of services for the victim, or both.'” (¶14 (citing Wis. Stat. § 938.34(5)(a)).
C.J.L. does not appeal the amount he was ordered to pay for a camera that the owner testified had been destroyed during the break in. His dispute lies with the surveillance subscription cost. COA reasons that the cost of a surveillance subscription for the other security camera cannot reasonably be said to be restitution for “damage to the property of another,” because C.J.L. did not damage that one. (¶15). The opinion further explains that the circuit court “appears to have relied on considerations that are authorized by the adult criminal restitution statute,” and explains the distinctions between that statute and the juvenile statute. (¶¶16-19).
As to the damage to the floor, COA looks at whether C.J.L.’s delinquent acts caused it. (¶20). The test here is the same as the adult restitution statute–there must be a causal nexus, which asks whether “the defendant’s criminal activity was a substantial factor in causing damage.” (¶20). “The defendant’s actions must be the precipitating cause of the injury and the harm must have resulted from the natural consequences of the actions.” State v. Canady, 2000 WI App 87, ¶9, 234 Wis. 2d 261, 610 N.W.2d 147. The court reasons that here, there is no evidence of a chain of events leading to the floor damage. (¶21). There is simply no evidence tying C.J.L. to the marks on the floor, except that he was “in the studio for a brief time three months before the marks were discovered.” Further, many other people spent time in the studio between the theft and the discovery of the marks. (¶23). Therefore, COA concludes that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in ordering restitution for the scratches and marks on the floor.
