State v. Kelsy R. Wooldridge, 2022AP1927-CR, 5/20/25, District III (not recommended for publication), case activity
In a decision not recommended for publication, the COA reversed Kelsy Wooldridge’s conviction for possessing methamphetamine and found that no reasonable jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that she knew a bloody syringe seized from her purse contained an unmeasurable amount of the drug.
Police conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle that was registered to Wooldridge, but in which she was the passenger. Wooldridge consented to police searching the car. The officer testified at trial that, inside Woodridge’s purse, he found a syringe with a bloody substance inside the tube and on the point of the needle. The officer said there was no clear liquid inside the syringe and he could not tell with the naked eye what substance was in the syringe. (¶¶ 3-4). The officer showed the syringe to Wooldridge and she nodded. He then asked Wooldridge if she had been using methamphetamine; she acknowledged she used one week prior. The officer did not ask if she recently used the syringe, knew what was inside of it, or if she put the syringe in her purse. (¶ 5).
The State’s laboratory analyst testified that the syringe contained no weighable amount of liquid, but only had a reddish residue that she could not identify by sight, and that methamphetamine is not red. However, the analyst identified the presence of methamphetamine after performing several tests, although she could not determine the specific amount. (¶ 6). The jury found Wooldridge guilty of possessing methamphetamine. (¶ 7).
Wooldridge argued on appeal that the State did not present evidence from which the jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she knowingly possessed methamphetamine because a “lay person” could not know that the bloody residue in the syringe contained an unidentifiable amount of methamphetamine. (¶ 12).
The Court considered that the strongest evidence for the State was that the bloody residue found on a used syringe in Wooldridge’s purse subsequently tested positive for an unmeasurable amount of methamphetamine. However, Wooldridge made no admissions that she used the syringe to consume methamphetamine or that she knew the syringe contained methamphetamine at any time. Although the blood residue was apparent to anyone, there was no evidence that Wooldridge knew it contained any methamphetamine: “The evidence established only that Wooldridge possessed a used syringe that, to the naked eye, contained only trace amounts of blood.” (¶ 19). The Court noted that the State did not present any evidence regarding why, how, or for how long methamphetamine would remain in residue form in a syringe after it was used to inject someone with the drug: “The lab analyst’s skill in detecting what was otherwise unobservable cannot be the ultimate determination of Wooldridge’s knowing possession of an unlawful substance.” (¶ 20).
The Court also considered the State’s circumstantial evidence to be weak because the officer did not observe evidence of recent drug use by Wooldridge, there was no visible amount of anything resembling methamphetamine on or in the syringe, and she made no admissions to law enforcement that the syringe contained methamphetamine. (¶ 21).
The Court rejected the State’s argument that Wooldridge nodding when confronted with the syringe by the officer inferred that she knew the syringe contained methamphetamine: “The most probative value of the nodding response is that Wooldridge agreed that the syringe was in her purse at that time and even that it was hers. But those facts are not at issue, and they are of little relevance to the knowledge element of the crime of possession of a controlled substance.” (¶ 23).
While the Court found there was sufficient evidence that Wooldridge did, at some point, use the syringe to inject methamphetamine, the State “needed to prove that Wooldridge knew or believed that the syringe still contained methamphetamine at the time of the traffic stop.” (¶ 23). However, the Court relied on SCOW’s 1977 decision in Kabat to conclude that “an individual cannot be convicted of possessing a controlled substance at a particular time when there is no evidence from which to reasonably infer that he or she knew or believed a substance that may have previously been used – and visually seemed to be depleted – remained in the container.” (¶ 25).
