State v. Joan L. Stetzer, 2025 WI 34, 7/3/25, affirming an unpublished decision from COA; case activity
Faced with a unique fact pattern arising from an OWI prosecution, SCOW interprets Wisconsin’s coercion defense and finds that Stetzer is unable to prevail, regardless of the clearly sympathetic facts presented.
In a nutshell, the relevant facts in this appeal are as follows. Stetzer was a victim of domestic violence perpetrated by her husband for over a decade. (¶5). On the night in question, the violence escalated to her husband physically attacking her and threatening her life. (¶8). Despite her intoxicated state, Stetzer made the choice to flee the scene in her car, hoping to drive 15 minutes to the couple’s lake house for safety. (¶9). However, her husband called the police, reported Stetzer’s intoxicated state, and told them of Stetzer’s intended destination. (¶8). Stetzer acknowledged driving by a squad car that was laying in wait for her and testified at trial that while she thought about stopping, her prior experiences with the police led her to assume she would be disbelieved and arrested. (¶9). She was then stopped and arrested for a PAC violation. (¶10).
At the bench trial, Stetzer claimed that the coercion defense applied and end exempted her from criminal liability. (¶11). The circuit court disagreed. (¶14). The court concluded that Stetzer’s flight to the lake house needed to be the only means of escape under these circumstances. (¶13). Accordingly, the coercion defense dissipated once Stetzer passed a police officer without stopping. (Id.). Following COA’s affirmance, SCOW addresses three issues.
“The first issue before us is whether the elements of the coercion defense must continue to be met for the entire duration of an ongoing, otherwise-criminal act.” (¶18). Stetzer argues that, so long as those elements are met at the outset of her criminal conduct–when she fled the home–“then she may continue engaging in the otherwise-criminal act, even if the elements cease to be met.” (Id.). SCOW disagrees. Here, the coercion defense in § 939.45(1) and § 939.46(1) has the following elements:
The “circumstances of coercion” referenced in § 939.45(1) are therefore present only when the three elements in § 939.46(1) are met: (1) there is a threat by another person; (2) the threat causes the defendant reasonably to believe that an otherwise-criminal act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm; and (3) the threat causes the defendant to engage in the act.
(¶19). “The most natural reading of this statutory language is that the coercion defense is available only when all three elements laid out in § 939.46(1) are met.” (¶20). Thus, the coercion defense can dissipate due to changing circumstances. This reading is consistent with how other closely-related defenses of self-defense and defense of others are understood. (¶21). Stetzer’s interpretation of the statute fails because “it lacks a meaningful limiting principle and would dramatically expand the scope of the defense.” (¶23).
The second issue is whether a defendant’s personal history is relevant to assessing the applicability of the coercion defense. (¶24). SCOW says the answer is yes. (Id). Under the statutory text, the relevant question is “whether it was reasonable for the defendant to believe there was a threat of imminent death or great bodily harm and that her act was the only means of preventing that harm. (¶25). This tracks the inquiry for self-defense and defense of others. (¶26). Thus, the relevant inquiry is “what a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would have believed in the defendant’s position under the circumstances that existed at that time.” (¶29). A mere subjective belief is insufficient; the fact-finder must determine if the person’s belief (taking into account their personal history) is objectively reasonable. (Id.).
Applying these principles to the circuit court’s decision, SCOW holds that “the circuit court’s interpretation of the coercion defense is correct[…].” (¶31). While some of the court’s remarks during its ruling were “imprecise,” SCOW is persuaded, based on an overall review of the court’s decision, that the court applied the correct legal test and made proper findings. (¶34). And, while Stetzer attacks the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate standard of review is exceedingly deferential and the facts in this case meet that standard. (¶36).
Justice Ziegler concurs, believing that any analysis of the coercion defense was unnecessary as the State conceded that Stetzer was entitled to a coercion instruction. (¶40). She also believes it was unnecessary to reach the personal history issue. (¶41).
Unsurprisingly in a case of this nature, Chief Justice Karofsky files an impassioned dissent. As to the reasonableness of Stetzer’s actions, Chief Justice Karofsky relies heavily on the expert testimony in this case, which claimed that Stetzer was in a state of psychological distress unique to domestic violence victims and which placed her in a “survival mode” which would lead her to ignore “peripheral details.” (¶71). She also seeks to distinguish the concept of “imminent” from “immediate,” and argues that this concept of “imminence” has an expansive definition in cases involving domestic violence. (¶72). She criticizes the majority for condoning the circuit court’s “analysis with a wink and a nod” and harshly criticizes the circuit court for not properly recognizing Stetzer’s victimhood and the way it impacted her decision-making. (¶77). She identifies the “elephant in the courtroom,” which she believes to be entrenched myths and assumptions about domestic violence. (¶85).
This case represents continued judicial hostility to battered women. No prior case law requires that the defendants actions be the only course of action open to her.
That the defendant reasonably believed that a companion would attempt to harm him or her if he if he or she did not comply with the companion’s orders only suggests that the safest course was to comply with companion’s orders, not that it was the only course. State v. Keeran, 2004 WI App 4, 268 Wis. 2d 761, 674 N.W.2d 570, 01-1892.