State v. Luis A. Ramirez, 2025 WI 28, 6/27/25, reversing a published decision from COA; case activity
When this case was issued, we got excited and informed our readers that this “big defense win” was an important decision on the speedy trial right. However, SCOW now unanimously reverses in favor of the State.
Having written something of a record-breaking post in terms of word count, we’ll start our discussion with SCOW’s application of the law. Those looking to reacquaint themselves with the facts should start with our previous post on the COA decision.
As Ramirez raises a constitutional speedy trial claim, SCOW begins by reiterating the four relevant factors discussed in Barker v. Wingo: “(1) the overall length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the speedy trial right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” (¶30).
Length of Delay
The length of the delay serves two analytical functions in analyzing a claimed speedy trial violation. At the outset, “the length of the delay carries little significance beyond serving as an initial threshold triggering the speedy trial analysis.” (¶32). It then reenters the analysis “‘as one factor among several,’ with particular significance to the court’s consideration of prejudice to the defendant.” (¶34).
Here, COA “overemphasized” the significance of the 46-month delay, which is “generally not long enough to declare a defendant prejudiced as a matter of law.” (¶33). To meet that standard, the delay would have to be closer to five or six years rather than just shy of four, as is the case here. (Id.). Moreover, “Even if the delay was prejudicial as a matter of law, ‘such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria.” (¶34). Thus, SCOW faults COA by independently weighing the overall length of the delay against the State before considering the interplay of other factors. (Id.). While the delay is presumptively prejudicial, (¶36), this factor alone is not dispositive:
Based on the overwhelming weight of both binding and persuasive authority, the delay in this case—46 months—was considerably less than what courts generally require before finding prejudice as a matter of law. Even if the length of Ramirez’s delay was, as the court of appeals put it, “extreme”, it should not have been weighed “heavily” against the State until the other Barker factors—the reasons for the delay, whether the defendant asserted his speedy trial right, and whether the defendant experienced any prejudice from the delay—were considered.
(¶38).
Reasons for the Delay
This second factor “examines whether the State or the defendant is more to blame for the time that passed from accusation to conviction.” (¶39). Even if delays are attributable to the State, the speedy trial analysis requires assessment of whether those delays are “valid, neutral, or deliberate” in order to determine how periods of delay ought to be weighed in the overall calculus. (¶40). Although the court of appeals engaged in searching analysis of each delay in the case, SCOW is satisfied that “no period should weigh heavily against [the State] under the second Barker factor.” (¶43). It therefore rejects COA’s finding that the State’s conduct evinced “cavalier disregard” for Ramirez’s right to a speedy trial and overrules that portion of COA’s prior decision in State v. Borhegyi articulating such a “cavalier disregard” standard. (¶43).
Once upon a time–a mere two decades ago–decisions of COA were entitled to stare decisis in SCOW. However, Wenke v. Gehl, which established the principle of stare decisis for COA decisions, was later overruled without much discussion in State v. Lira. As a footnote to this opinion recognizes, SCOW is therefore no longer required to give any justification for overruling binding COA precedent. Notwithstanding the lack of any need to give justification for modifying Wisconsin law, SCOW informs the reader that it is overruling Borhegyi for two reasons: (1) it “lacks a reasoned foundation in binding or persuasive precedent,” and (2) it “poses a practical problem with establishing why the circuit court did not schedule hearings sooner.”
Having overruled the cavalier disregard standard central to COA’s granular review of the facts of this case, SCOW holds that it “need not scrutinize every period of delay attributed to the State by the court of of appeals. It is clear from the facts that, at worst, the periods of delay caused by the State were for neutral reasons. Consequently, we weigh the second Barker factor against the State, but not heavily.” (¶48).
Assertion of the Speedy Trial Right
SCOW holds that “Ramirez’s delay in requesting a speedy trial was significant.” (¶50). There was a roughly 32-month delay in asserting the right, meaning that the assertion of the right weighs “only slightly in [Ramirez’s] favor.” (Id.).
Prejudice
Three interests are relevant here: “oppressive pretrial incarceration; anxiety and concern; and the possibility the defense will be impaired.” (¶52). Ramirez is unable to establish any of these interests, however, and his arguments that prejudice be presumed as a matter of law are flatly rejected. (¶¶52-53).
Balancing of Factors
Given the foregoing discussion, SCOW therefore holds that Ramirez’s speedy trial right was not infringed:
On balance, we conclude Ramirez’s speedy trial right was not infringed. At most, we could assign the State responsibility for 958 days of delay, caused by neutral reasons weighed against the State, but not heavily. Ramirez waited 32 months before filing a pro se speedy trial demand and waited nearly another seven months before filing his second pro se speedy trial demand. His trial occurred 14 months after he filed his first demand. Ramirez failed to make any particularized showings of prejudice and relies exclusively on the total length of the delay attributable to the State to show prejudice as a matter of law. Given the significant time it took Ramirez to assert his right and the absence of prejudice as a matter of fact, we are not convinced that even 958 days of neutral delays warrant dismissal.
(¶54).
Chief Justice A.W. Bradley, joined by Justice Protasiewicz, concurs. She agrees with the majority that Ramirez’s failure to timely assert his speedy trial right is fatal to his constitutional claim. (¶61). However, she expresses concern about the rigor of the majority’s analysis, which she believes has made it too difficult for defendants to ever succeed on a speedy trial claim “absent a delay of over six years or intentional dilatory tactics by the State.” (Id.). As Chief Justice, she is especially concerned by attorney shortages and other systemic problems that may exacerbate an unfairly slow justice system.
Justices Dallet and Karofsky also concur in the majority opinion, but write separately to disclaim any affiliation with certain portions of the lead opinion which they claim are improperly adversarial against Chief Justice Bradley.
Finally, Justice Karofsky files another concurrence which asserts that the rights of the victim must be included in an assessment of a constitutional speedy trial claim.
