Michael Williams v. Michael Meisner, No. 23-3268, 6/16/25
In a case that likely signals the end of a long legal battle over a Wisconsin jury instruction telling jurors to “search for the truth,” the Seventh Circuit holds that the petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.
Readers will likely be familiar with the substance of this appeal, as it involves an issue resolved by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 2019, whether Wis. JI-140 unconstitutionally lowers the burden of proof by informing jurors not to search for doubt and instead to search for “the truth.” SCOW held there is nothing improper about the instruction. For more context and analysis, you can check out our post on Trammell here.
Williams presents two issues for review in this habeas appeal. His first issue is as follows:
Williams first argues that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent when it concluded that it was not reasonably likely that the jury had applied the reasonable doubt instruction in a manner that violated due process. In his view, the instruction permitted the jury to convict him without requiring the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
(p.7). Williams relies on a trio of SCOTUS cases–Victor v. Nebraska, Cage v. Louisiana, and Sullivan v. Louisiana–to argue that Wisconsin’s COA acted unreasonably when it determined that the “search for the truth” language in JI-140 did not water down the constitutionally-required reasonable doubt standard. (Id.). Those cases offer some parameters for defining reasonable doubt to jurors; ultimately, the Court is confident this instruction did not run afoul of SCOTUS’s precedent. Instead, reading the instruction in context, “the instructions correctly apprised the jury that its role was to try to discern the true facts and arrive at a verdict that is consistent with the evidence and the court’s instructions of law.” (p.10).
In addition to arguing that the jury instructions violated his right to due process, Williams also points to comments of the prosecutor in rebuttal as supporting another basis for a new trial:
In particular, Williams points to the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument that defense counsel’s theory had “no answer” for the evidence tying Madison to both shootings, “no answer” for McAffee’s testimony linking Williams with Madison, and “no answer” for the fact that Williams checked into a nearby hospital with a gunshot wound wearing camouflage pants.
(p.11). In essence, Williams argues that these statements suggesting he had “no answer” for the State’s evidence shifted the burden of proof. (Id.). Although the Court canvasses a number of authorities in analyzing whether the comments were, in fact, improper, ultimately the case is resolvable on narrower grounds because of the circuit court’s instructions that closing arguments are not evidence:
In the eyes of the appellate court, these instructions cured any potential misunderstanding regarding the prosecution’s burden of proof and eliminated the possibility of undue prejudice. We believe this was a reasonable application of controlling Supreme Court precedent.
(p.14).
