In this Illinois case, the State charged the defendant with sexually abusing a teenager, R.L., who experienced PTSD as a result of the abuse. Citing the Americans with Disabilities Act, the State moved for permission to let R.L. testify with her service dog present because it feared she might experience a PTSD episode on the stand. Motion granted, and order affirmed. Apparently, other states have also concluded that the presence of a service dog does not create undue sympathy for a testifying victim.
State v. Chidiebele Praises Ozodi, 2019AP886-CR, District 2, 12/16/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The legislature amended § 939.42 in 2013 Wis. Act 307 to eliminate the defense of voluntary intoxication when the intoxication negated the existence of a requisite mental state, like intent or knowledge. But because the state has the burden of proving every element of an offense, including the mental state, there’s a due process argument that evidence of intoxication that might negate that element is relevant and admissible, despite the absence of a statutory defense of voluntary intoxication. (¶27 & n.4). If that’s so, then what, if anything, should the court tell the jury about how to use that evidence? [continue reading…]
State v. Jeffrey R. Lindahl, 2019AP997-CR, District 3, 12/15/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In State v. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, 238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528, the supreme court held that a collateral attack against a prior conviction used to enhance a penalty must be based on the denial of the right to counsel in the prior case. The court of appeals holds that “denial of the right to counsel” doesn’t include denial of the right to the effective assistance of counsel. [continue reading…]
Barron County DHS v. M.S., 2020AP1257, District 3, 12/17/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
If we were quarantining in Vegas, we’d bet this case is heading to SCOW. The briefs are confidential but the main issues appear to be: whether the summary judgment deadline in §802.08(1) governs TPR cases; whether a court may extend that deadline for good cause; and how those rules apply to the facts of this case. The COA sows confusion by stating that it has conducted “independent research” suggesting that, despite SCOW precedent and the parties’ agreement, §802.08(1) doesn’t actually apply. It then applies §802.08(1). [continue reading…]
Outagamie County v. R.W., 2020AP1171-FT, 12/17/20, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
Nobody testified that Rachel behaved dangerously during her extant commitment. Her doctor had no knowledge of medication non-compliance. A social worker once saw a Haldol pill on a plate on a counter and inferred that Rachel had not taken her meds on that occasion. The reason that doctor and social worker recommended recommitment is that several times in the past Rachel was released from commitment, stopped medication, and decompensated. To prevent that cycle, she had to be recommited. Rachel cannot change the past, so by that logic, she must be recommitted forever. [continue reading…]
Fond Du Lac County v. R.O.V., 2019AP1228, 2020AP853, 12/16/20, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
In these consolidated cases, the court of appeals reviewed both Ray’s initial commitment and his 2nd recommitment (not his 1st recommitment), which has not yet ended. Although the initial commitment order expired long ago, the court held that it was not moot due to a recurring, “sufficiency of the evidence” regarding dangerousness that might affect the outcome of his appeal from the 2nd recommitment.
The doctors who examined Ray for his initial commitment and for his 2nd recommitment agreed that he is mentally ill and a proper subject for treatment. They diagnosed him with either bipolar disorder with psychotic features, schizoaffective disorder bipolar type, or schizophrenia. The main dispute was over his alleged dangerousness. [continue reading…]
State v. Gerald D. Taylor, 2019AP1244-CR, District 1, 12/15/20, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In 1999, a court imposed two, consecutive, 30-year indeterminate sentences on Taylor for child sexual assault. Accounting for the parole system in place, the court told Taylor he would be eligible for parole after serving one-quarter (15 years) of his sentence, and he could end up serving two-thirds (40 years), which is when he would reach his mandatory release date. Taylor moved for a sentence modification because the court didn’t realize his sentence had a presumptive release date (not a mandatory release) which results in a lengthier confinement. [continue reading…]
Wisconsin is not alone. According to the ABA Journal, an Ohio Supreme Court justice has removed a trial court judge from 2 trials for allegedly failing to follow appropriate COVID precautions.
