by admin
on July 28, 2019
State v. Medford B. Matthews, III, 2019 WI App 44; case activity (including briefs)
It’s a crime in Wisconsin to have sex with a person under 18. Specifically, it’s a misdemeanor, if that person is 16 or older—like the 17-and-a-half-year-old alleged victim here. But, it’s tough to have sex without (1) being in a private (or “secluded”) place and (2) exposing one’s genitals. And while the legislature has codified the obvious difference between having sex with, say, an 11-year-old and a 17-year-old (again, by making the latter a misdemeanor), it hasn’t drawn those lines in Wis. Stat. §§ 948.07(1) and 948.10(1), which criminalize child enticement and exposing intimate parts to a child. In each case, “child” means somebody under 18. Perhaps the legislature imagined the decency and good sense of prosecutors would prevent abuse of this discrepancy. Perhaps—no, certainly—the legislature was being optimistic. Because here, though the completed sex act the 28-year-old Matthews is charged with carries a maximum nine-month jail sentence, the six(!) associated felonies carry 65 years in prison. The circuit court called the charging decision “absurd” and “abusive” but, as the state successfully argued in the court of appeals, prosecutors have essentially total discretion: i.e., the power to act abusively, so long as they can make out the elements of an offense. And though the court of appeals telegraphs some mild discomfort with the prosecutor’s oh-so-creative exercise of this discretion, it says the the result is not absurd in a legal sense. So, it reverses the circuit court’s dismissal of the felonies. The result is that Matthews will face a potential life sentence for sex with a 17-year-old–a crime of which a truly scandalous number of us are guilty.
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by admin
on July 28, 2019
State v. Adam Blaine Anderson, 2018AP718, 7/23/19, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A sheriff’s deputy saw Anderson, who had an outstanding warrant, in the yard of an a acquaintance with whom he was staying. Specifically, the sheriff saw him by means of a live surveillance video; they’d installed a camera on a telephone pole across the street as part of an investigation into meth dealing. He alerted other officers, who showed up at the residence and eventually, after a chase, arrested Anderson. [continue reading…]
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by admin
on July 27, 2019
State v. James A. Culver, 2018AP799-CR, District 4, 7/25/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Back in 2008 Culver was convicted and sentenced for OWI, fifth offense, with a minor in the car, which doubles the minimum and maximum penalties, § 346.65(2)(f). Now that his extended supervision (ES) is being revoked he challenges the length of the ES term originally imposed. He argues the presence of a minor is a penalty enhancer, which lengthens the term of initial confinement but not the term of ES, see § 973.01(2)(c)1. and State v. Volk, 2002 WI App 274, 258 Wis. 2d 584, 654 N.W.2d 24. No, says the court of appeals, under State v. Jackson, 2004 WI 29, 270 Wis. 2d 113, 676 NW.2d 872, OWI with a minor passenger is an unclassified felony, so the term of ES is increased, too. [continue reading…]
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by admin
on July 27, 2019
State v. Lonnie P. Ayotte, Jr., 2018AP839-CR, 7/25/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Like Jessica Randall, Ayotte consented to a blood draw after his OWI arrest but then asserted his right to privacy in his blood and told authorities they couldn’t test his blood for alcohol without a warrant. As they did with Randall, the authorities tested the blood anyway. And like Randall, Ayotte gets nowhere in his challenge to the admissibility of the test because in State v. Randall, 2019 WI 80, “the lead and concurring opinions agree that a person in Ayotte’s position does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcohol content of blood that was legally drawn.” (¶8).
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by admin
on July 27, 2019
State v. Johnalee A. Kawalec, 2017AP798, 7/24/19, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
We’ve questioned the blanket claim that a lawyer can’t be ineffective for failing to argue an unsettled proposition of law. Here we have the sort of case for which the general rule makes some sense. Kawalec was charged with theft by a bailee under Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(b). She was the holder of a joint bank account with the alleged victim; the victim had given her a power of attorney but the relationship fell apart and she was accused of having used some of the funds for her own benefit, rather than abiding by the prohibition on self-dealing inherent in the POA. [continue reading…]
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by admin
on July 27, 2019
City of Milwaukee v. David B. Munzinger, 2018AP2186, 7/23/2019, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Munzinger fought his OWI citation in the municipal court and lost; he filed an appeal to the circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 800.14. To do this, his counsel filed a form in the circuit court captioned “Notice of Appeal” (probably this one, provided by the municipal court). He also emailed the city attorney alerting him to the appeal and apparently spoke to him about it. But, his email didn’t include a copy of the “Notice of Appeal” form. The city moved to dismiss and the circuit court granted the motion. [continue reading…]
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by admin
on July 21, 2019
SCOW watchers may be interested in SCOWstats’ 3 new posts on the 2018-2019 term. The justices issued fewer fractured opinions, fewer separate opinions, and shorter opinions. With all of these efficiencies you might guess that they decided more cases. But the number of decisions actually dropped this term. Also, the data reveals the impact of Justice Abrahamson’s reduced participation in the cases SCOW did take. With her departure on July 31st, that is likely to continue. Find out more here.
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by admin
on July 21, 2019
State v. Craig L. Miller, 2018AP2161-CR, 7/18/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Miller pled guilty to disorderly conduct as a domestic abuse incident and as a repeater. He appealed arguing that his plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary because of his schizophrenia diagnosis and the medication he was taking. The court of appeals ruled against him due to a lack of evidence. [continue reading…]
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