If you find fractured SCOW decisions (you know, the kind where no opinion commands 4 votes) really irritating, today’s edition of SCOWstats won’t calm you down. As you’ve probably sensed they’re on the rise even though SCOW is composed of 5 conservatives and 2 liberals.
Update: Today’s decision by SCOW won’t calm you down either. See AllEnergy Corporation v. Trempeleau County Environment & Land Use Committee, 2017WI52. There’s a lead opinion (Abrahamson and A.W. Bradley), an opinion concurring in the lead opinion’s mandate but not its reasoning (Ziegler and Roggensack), and a dissenting opinion (Kelly, and Gableman, R.G. Bradley).
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SCOW’s recent decision in State v. Jeffrey Denny, which restricted the availability of postconviction DNA testing in Wisconsin, was a real heart-breaker. Essentially, SCOW held that to get state-funded DNA testing the defendant has to prove the results would conclusively remove him from the scene of the crime. In a decision the EvidenceProf Blog calls a “landmark,” the Maryland court of appeals has reached the opposite conclusion. Read about it here.
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Juan Esquivel-Quintana v. Jefferson B. Sessions, USSC No. 16-54, 2017 WL 2322840 (May 30, 2017), reversing Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019 (6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
A non-citizen convicted of an “aggravated felony” is subject to virtually automatic deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). One of the crimes listed as an aggravated felony is “sexual abuse of a minor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). In this case the Supreme Court holds that “in the context of statutory rape offenses that criminalize sexual intercourse based solely on the age of the participants, the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor requires that the victim be younger than 16.” (Slip op. at 4). Because Esquivel-Quintana was convicted under a statute prohibiting sexual intercourse with a victim under the age of 18, he was not convicted of “sexual abuse of a minor” for purposes of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. [continue reading…]
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State v. William A. Wisth, 2016AP1481-CR, 5/24/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
After Wisth, acting pro se, and the State picked a jury for his criminal case, the judge instructed the jurors “not to discuss the case with anyone.” The next day before trial, Wisch appeared by the public entrance to the courthouse with a sign and a stack of flyers that, in short, said “don’t trust Judge Malloy or Ozaukee County.” He tried to hand a flyer to a woman walking by, but she shook her head. She did not see what the sign or the flyers said. Turns out she was a juror. Uh oh. [continue reading…]
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State v. Scot Alan Krueger, 2016AP2438-CR, 5/25/17, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court erred in holding Krueger failed to make a prima facie showing that he didn’t validly waive the right to counsel in a prior OWI conviction. [continue reading…]
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State v. Shaun R. Ezrow, 2016AP1611-CR, 5/25/17, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The cost a business incurred in enhancing its security system after an employee stole money was a proper item of restitution under § 973.20. [continue reading…]
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Bill Tyroler, On Point’s original writer, has kept a low profile since he retired. But lucky for us he can’t contain himself regarding SCOW’s decision in State v. Howes and court of appeals recent certification in State v. Gerald Smith. He says SCOW’s Howes opinion allows defense counsel to argue that exigent circumstances are required for a warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist. See Bill’s comments here and here.
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Crawford County v. E.K., 2016AP2063, 5/18/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
This case presents multiple SCOW-worthy issues. One is an interesting constitutional dilemma. The County sought to extend E.K.’s commitment and involuntary medication order and, as evidence, offered threatening emails that E.K. had allegedly sent. Defense counsel objected because the emails had not been authenticated. So the County called E.K. to the stand to authenticate them. Defense counsel objected on 5th Amendment grounds. This prompted E.K. to say: “I’ll waive that. Yes, those are my emails.” [continue reading…]
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