This week Pacific Standard magazine reported on some interesting new research. Jurors are more likely to convict a person accused of a gruesome crime if they are shown color photographs of the victim rather than black and white photographs. Read more here.
This week Wired ran an op-ed arguing that courts should stop using algorithms to set bail and sentence defendants until some ground rules are set. Yes, it discusses Compas and State v. Loomis. But beyond that it describes what could happen if courts move from using simple algorithms to using deep learning algorithms known as neural networks to sentence someone. Here is an excerpt from the article:
Consider a scenario in which the defense attorney calls a developer of a neural-network-based risk assessment tool to the witness stand to challenge the “high risk” score that could affect her client’s sentence. On the stand, the engineer could tell the court how the neural network was designed, what inputs were entered, and what outputs were created in a specific case. However, the engineer could not explain the software’s decision-making process. With these facts, or lack thereof, how does a judge weigh the validity of a risk-assessment tool if she cannot understand its decision-making process? How could an appeals court know if the tool decided that socioeconomic factors, a constitutionally dubious input, determined a defendant’s risk to society? Following the reasoning in Loomis, the court would have no choice but to abdicate a part of its responsibility to a hidden decision-making process.
State v. Steven T. Delap, 2016AP2196-CR, 4/20/17, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 7/18/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 64; case activity (including briefs)
Police tried to arrest Delap outside his home on warrants for fleeing from a couple of traffic stops, but when they approached and said “stop, police,” Delap fled into his home. The police followed and arrested him inside. (¶¶3-6). Delap’s challenge to his arrest is no more successful than his attempt to flee. [continue reading…]
State v. Joel Maurice , 2016AP633-CR, 4/18/17, District 1 (unpublished); case activity (including briefs)
Maurice presented 7 issues for review, which the court of appeals rejected with a scant tablespoon of law. This 32-page opinion reads like a summary of trial testimony and is probably not worth your time unless you happen to be working on one of the issues or you want to see how many ways the court of appeals can reformulate the “prejudice” prong of Strickland’s test for ineffective assistance of counsel. First, here is a rundown of the issues: [continue reading…]
State v. Brandon Arthur Millard, 2016AP1474-CR, 4/20/17, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
¶10 This court has previously rejected arguments that Daubert applies to a law enforcement officer’s testimony regarding HGN. See State v. VanMeter, No. 2014AP1852, unpublished slip op. (WI App Nov. 24, 2015), and State v. Warren, No. 2012AP1727, unpublished slip op. (WI App Jan. 16, 2013).
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¶14 Although not binding precedential authority, I conclude that our reasoning in Warren and VanMeter is persuasive. …. I conclude that Millard’s trial counsel was not deficient for failing to raise a Daubert challenge to Officer Welte’s testimony regarding the HGN test because Officer Welte’s testimony was not scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized and, therefore, Daubert does not apply. ….
Manrique v. United States, USSC No. 15-7250, 2017 WL 1390728 (April 19, 2017), affirming United States v. Manrique, 618 Fed. App. 579 (11th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Lawyers handling federal criminal appeals, take note: This decision holds that, to challenge a deferred restitution order under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), that is entered in an amended judgment issued after the defendant has filed a notice of appeal, the defendant must file a second notice of appeal from the amended judgment containing the restitution amount. [continue reading…]
State v. C.G.B., 2017 WI App 32; case activity
While the juvenile code gives a judge the authority to dismiss a juvenile delinquency petition and refer the case for a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) over the district attorney’s objection, State v. Lindsey A.F., 2003 WI 63, 262 Wis. 2d 200, 663 N.W.2d 757, the code does not give the judge the authority to dismiss a petition and order a consent decree over the DA’s objection. [continue reading…]
State v. Thomas G. St. Peter, 2016AP683-CR, District 1, 4/18/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
St. Peter is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the judge violated his due process rights when it relied on inaccurate information to jump the parties’ joint recommendation for time served and impose more jail time. State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1 (sentencing based on inaccurate information violates due process). Not only that, but the judge erroneously exercised his sentencing discretion by failing to link the relevant facts and factors of the case to the standard sentencing objectives. —And you thought an erroneous exercise of sentencing discretion was as mythical a beast as a unicorn! [continue reading…]
