State v. T.R.D., 2016AP1413, District 1, 11/29/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
T.R.D. challenges the circuit court’s conclusions that she was an unfit parent and that it was in the best interests of her child for T.R.D.’s parental rights to be terminated. The court of appeals rejects the challenges. [continue reading…]
Portage County DHHS v. D.B., 2016AP1233 & 1234, 11/17/16, District 4 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
D.B. raises challenges to both the disposition and grounds phases of the hearing that resulted in the termination of her rights to her two children. The court of appeals rejects both. [continue reading…]
Dane County DHS v. S.C., 2016AP1787, 11/17/16, District 4 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
S.C. appeals the termination of her parental rights to her daughter D.C. She pled to a continuing CHIPS ground; she challenges only the circuit court’s discretionary conclusion, at the dispositional phase, that termination was in D.C.’s best interest. [continue reading…]
State v. Brenda S. Webster, 2016AP225-CR, District 3, 11/15/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
M.P., the complaining witness at Webster’s trial, for robbery of a grocery store, spoke only Spanish, so she testified through an interpreter. On three occasions the interpreter mistranslated M.P.’s testimony. The court of appeals holds the interpreter’s mistakes, considered individually or together, weren’t sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. [continue reading…]
SCOTUSblog has named a cert petition filed by the Maryland Public Defender “petition of the day“!! Here are the issues:
1. Under the exception to the warrant requirement announced in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009), permitting a vehicular search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest “when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle,” what quantum of particularized suspicion is required by the Fourth Amendment to justify the search?
2. May the unquantified experience of the arresting officer, alone, supply the necessary particularized suspicion to justify the vehicular search?
Wisconsin, which has trimmed the Fourth Amendment down to more like a Three and a Half Amendment, follows a per se rule requiring no particularized suspicion. See State v. Smiter, 2011 WI App 15. Under this rule, a belief is reasonable, and an officer may search a vehicle, when the recent occupant’s offense of arrest is a non-traffic infraction that could generate physical evidence. On Point will keep you posted on this petition.
Here’s hoping our Maryland comrades get their cert petition granted–even (or especially) without an amicus brief! See post below.
If you dream of arguing a case to SCOTUS, this new study may dash your hopes. It suggests that SCOTUS doesn’t seriously consider cases that lack an “amicus wrangler” (someone to recruit the right amici) and an “amicus whisperer” (someone to coordinate the wrangled amici’s messages). Just one amicus brief by any ole lawyer won’t do the trick. Think several amici–each one represented by a member of a select group of SCOTUS specialists. Turns out they shape the court’s docket more than anyone. The authors attempt to defend this clubby practice as being very helpful to the modern court. See if they persuade you.
State v. Isiah O. Smith, 2015AP1645-CR, 11/15/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Two guys walk into an apartment complex and leave a short time later. One carried a gun and a cell phone; the other a cell phone. They got into a car belonging to a friend of the guy carrying only the cell phone and drove off. A surveillance video captured these movements but not the shooting death that occurred in the complex at about the same time. Was there sufficient evidence to convict the guy holding just the cell phone of 2nd degree reckless homicide as a party to a crime? [continue reading…]
State v. Tydis Trinard Odom, 2015AP2525-CR; District 2, 11/9/16; certification refused 1/9/17; case activity (including briefs)
Issue:
Does the imposition of multiple DNA surcharges constitute “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) such that a court’s failure to advise a defendant about them before taking his or her plea establishes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent?
