Most states and the federal government have a rule of evidence generally prohibiting the introduction of juror testimony regarding statements made during deliberations when offered to challenge the jury’s verdict. Known colloquially as “no impeachment” rules, they are typically codified as Rule 606(b); in some states, they are a matter of common law.
The question presented is whether a “no impeachment” rule constitutionally may bar evidence of racial bias offered to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury? [continue reading…]
Woods v. Etherton, USSC No. 15-723 (April 4, 2016) (per curiam), reversing Etherton v. Rivard, 800 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2015); SCOTUSblog page (including links to petition, response and reply)
This was a federal habeas action in which the petitioner claimed, among other things, that: (1) the state trial court’s admission of an anonymous tip violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause, (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the tip; and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise claims (1) and (2). The petitioner lost because, in SCOTUS’s view, his appellate counsel and the state habeas court deserved, but were not given, the benefit of the doubt. [continue reading…]
Lester Ray Nichols v. United States, USSC No. 15-5238, 2016 WL 1278473, (April 4, 2016), reversing United States v. Nichols, 775 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
In a unanimous opinion of limited impact, the Supreme Court holds that a prior version of SORNA did not require a registered sex offender to notify his state registration authority before moving out of the country. [continue reading…]
It’s been a quiet week for appellate decisions, so here are some links to sate your appetite for law-related reading: [continue reading…]
Michael Carter v. Stephen Duncan, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 13-2243, 3/30/16
Carter sought habeas relief on the ground his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to investigate what two defense potential witnesses had to say and failing to present their testimony at his murder trial. The Seventh Circuit holds that although the state court “stumble[d] in some respects” in determining that the failure to present the proffered testimony wasn’t prejudicial, that determination was not unreasonable under AEDPA’s deferential standard of review. [continue reading…]
Sila Luis v. United States, USSC No. 14-419, 2016 WL 1228690 (March 30, 2016), vacating and remanding U.S. v. Luis, 564 Fed. Appx. 493 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
The question presented in this case is whether the pretrial restraint of a criminal defendant’s legitimate, untainted assets—that is, assets not traceable to a criminal offense—needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment. A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court answers “yes,” though for different reasons. [continue reading…]
Whether, under Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), and Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110 (2009), a vacated, unconstitutional conviction can cancel out the preclusive effect of an acquittal under the collateral estoppel prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause? [continue reading…]
Marquette County v. T.F.W., 2015AP2603-FT, 3/24/16, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
At T.F.W.’s ch. 51 extension hearing, one of the examining physicians was asked “have the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to [T.F.W.’s] medication been explained to [him]?” Her answer: “Yes, they have.” (¶7). That was the extent of the testimony on the matter, but the court of appeals holds it was good enough to satisfy the requirement of § 51.61(1)(g)4.(intro.) and Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607. [continue reading…]
