Whether the requirements of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force claim brought by a plaintiff who was a pretrial detainee at the time of the incident are satisfied by a showing that the state actor deliberately used force against the pretrial detainee and the use of force was objectively unreasonable.
State v. Michael Alger & State v. Ronald Knipfer, 2015 WI 3, 1/20/15, affirming two published court of appeals decisions,: Alger, 2013 WI App 148; Knipfer, 2014 WI App 9; majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; case activity: Alger; Knipfer
The supreme court holds that the Daubert standard for expert testimony does not apply to discharge proceedings in a ch. 980 case if the original petition for commitment was filed before the effective date of the adoption of the Daubert standard. The court also holds there are no due process or equal protection problems in applying one evidentiary standard to cases in which the original petition was filed before the effective date and a different evidentiary standard to cases filed after that date.
Christeson v. Roper, USSC No. 14-6873, 2015 WL 232187 (January 20, 2015) (per curiam); docket
The Supreme Court holds that the lower courts failed to properly apply Martel v. Clair, 565 U. S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1276 (2012), when they denied Christeson’s request to substitute appointed counsel in his federal habaeas case.
Holt v. Hobbs, USSC No. 13-6827, 2015 WL 232143 (January 20, 2015); reversing 509 Fed. Appx. 561 (8th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page
An Arkansas prison regulation bans inmates from having beards except when they have a medical need based on a diagnosed dermatological condition (in which case they can grow a 1/4-inch beard). Citing this regulation, prison officials barred Holt (a.k.a. Abdul Maalik Muhammad) from growing a 1/2-inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs. The Supreme Court holds that as applied in this case, the regulation violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
Whether, to convict a defendant of distribution of a controlled substance analogue, the government must prove the defendant knew that the substance constituted a controlled substance analog, as held by the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, but rejected by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits.
St. Croix County DHHS v. Michael D. & Juanita A., 2014AP2431, District 3, 1/16/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 4/16/15, reversed, 2016 WI 35; case activity
The court of appeals holds that the notice requirements of §§ 48.415(2)(a)1. and 48.356(2) were not satisfied because the last order concerning out-of-home placement of Juanita’s child did not include the written notice of the applicable grounds for termination or the conditions for Matthew’s return. The County therefore failed to meet its burden of proof on the continuing CHIPS ground under § 48.415(2)(a)1. and the termination order is vacated and the TPR petition dismissed.
Carl C. Gilbert, Jr., v. Deborah McCulloch, No. 13-3460 (7th Cir. Jan. 12, 2015)
Gilbert was committed as a sexually violent person while he was still in prison serving a criminal sentence, so he was not transferred to the ch. 980 treatment facility till he finished the sentence. The state courts upheld his commitment and the Seventh Circuit now rejects Gilbert’s habeas challenge, holding the state court’s decision was not clearly contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
Jennings v. Stephens, USSC No. 13-7211, 2015 WL 159277 (January 14, 2015), reversing Jennings v. Stephens, 537 Fed. Appx. 326 (5th Cir. July 22, 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
A federal district court granted Jennings’s habeas relief, ordering a new sentencing hearing based on two of the three theories of ineffective assistance of counsel that Jennings raised. The state appealed, and Jennings defended the district court judgment on all three theories. The Fifth Circuit held that Jennings’s claim on the third theory was procedurally barred because it was rejected by the district court and Jennings hadn’t cross-appealed or obtained a certificate of appealability. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Scalia the Supreme Court reverses, holding that Jennings may defend the district court’s judgment based on the third theory.
