State v. Jermaine C., 2014AP467, District 1, 10/21/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court’s decision at Jermaine’s disposition hearing to stay the sex offender registration requirement wasn’t a permanent stay of the requirement under § 938.34(16) and State v. Cesar G., 2004 WI 61, 272 Wis. 2d 22, 682 N.W.2d 1, because the record shows the circuit court was only deferring a final decision on a permanent stay pending reviews of Jermaine’s progress.
Consolidated review of two published court of appeals decisions: State v. Weissinger, 2014 WI App 73 (case activity); and State v. Luedtke, 2014 WI App 79 (case activity)
Issues (composed by On Point)
In light of State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582, does the Wisconsin Constitution provide greater due process protection than the federal constitution, such that defendants charged with operating with a detectable amount of a controlled substance in their blood are denied due process under the Wisconsin Constitution when their blood samples are destroyed before the defendants had notice of the charges or test results and thus had no chance to get the blood independently tested?
Does the offense of operating with a detectable amount of controlled substances in the blood violate due process by failing to require the state to prove that the defendant knowingly ingested the controlled substance?
Dane County v. Joshua H. Quisling, 2013AP2743, 10/16/14, District 4, (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
Applying the “community caretaker” doctrine, the court of appeals held that a police officer was justified in stopping Quisling’s car based upon an informant’s tip that he was suicidal. Evidence obtained after the stop need not be suppressed, and Quisling’s OWI conviction stands.
State v. Addison F. Steiner, 2013AP2629-CR, district 4, 10/16/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
This case raises an issue that even the court of appeals deemed to be of first impression. Does §948.20, which criminalizes abandonment of a child, require an intent to abandon a child permanently, or is leaving a child alone for 1 or 2 hours enough? If the latter, then how is “child abandonment” different from “child neglect” under §948.21? The court of appeals refused to address the issue for reasons that should trouble anyone challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict.
State v. Jessica Ann Stofflet, 2014AP823-CR, 10/16/14, District 4 (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals held that the officer who stopped Stofflet’s vehicle and conducted a preliminary breath test had probable cause to believe she was committing OWI.
The officer observed that she had deviated within her lane, swerved over the fog line, varied her speed, swerved into the left lane, engaged in hard braking and slowed to 35 mph in a 65 mph zone. It was 4:30 a.m. Her car smelled of alcohol. Her speech was slow or slurred. Her right eye was bloodshot and glassy, and she admitted that she had consumed a couple of drinks earlier that evening.
Stofflet is employed as a dancer at a bar. She argued that she was afraid that she was being stalked or followed as she drove home on a semi-rural road. The court of appeals held that these facts added to, rather than subtracted from probable cause:
While it might be reasonable to slow down a bit to see if a following vehicle will pass, Stofflet’s hard braking and excessively slow speed were likely indicative of intoxicated driving. That is to say, a reasonable officer could view Stofflet’s statement about a stalker as a quickly made-up and poor excuse for obviously suspicious driving behavior. And, of course, if the facts support a reasonable inference of unlawful conduct, the officer is entitled to draw that inference “notwithstanding the existence of other innocent inferences that could be drawn.” See State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 84, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990).
State v. Deborah K. Salzwedel, 2014AP301-CR, 10/16/14, District 4 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Salzwedel’s motion to suppress and her conviction for OWI (3rd offense). Apparently, a deputy was driving right behind Salzwedel when she made a quick left turn in front of him without using her turn signal. The court of appeals held that the deputy had probable cause to stop her vehicle for a violation of §346.34(1)b, which governs turns, and to seize the evidence which led to her conviction.
Kenosha County v. Steven H., 2014AP1435-FT, District 2, 10/15/14 (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals here affirmed an order finding Steven H. “dangerous” under §51.20(1)(a)2.b, which requires, among other things, evidence that people were placed in reasonable fear of Steven’s violent behavior. Under this standard, a court may consider threats voiced to third parties rather than to the potential victims. R.J. v. Winnebago County, 146 Wis. 2d 516, 521-22, 431 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1988).
State v. Gabriel Justin Bogan, 2014AP285-CR, District 1, 10/14/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
In this 1st-degree reckless homicide and 1st-degree reckless endangering safety case, the court of appeals held that the evidence presented at trial did not support a “defense of others” jury instruction. Thus, Bogan’s trial lawyer was not ineffective for failing to pursue that theory of defense.
