On Point

Paul Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, affirming unpublished opinion of court of appeals
For Rutzinski: Craig A. Mastantuono, Maureen Fitzgerald

Issue: Whether an unidentified motorist’s cell phone report of suspicious driving justified a stop.

Holding:

¶38 In sum, we hold that the tip in this case provided sufficient justification for an investigative stop of Rutzinski. First, the tip contained sufficient indicia of the informant’s reliability: the information in the tip exposed the informant to possible identification and, therefore, to possible arrest if the tip proved false; the tip reported contemporaneous and verifiable observations regarding Rutzinski’s alleged erratic driving, location, and vehicle’s description; and Officer Sardina verified many of the details in the informant’s tip. Second, the allegations in the tip could suggest to a reasonable police officer that Rutzinski was operating his vehicle while intoxicated. This exigency strongly weighs in favor of immediate police investigation. For these reasons, we conclude that the stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 11, and we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Contrast, U.S. v. Reaves, 4th Cir No. 06-5073, 1/8/08 (distinguishing Rutzinski: “Here, the caller studiously avoided providing information that would have allowed her identity to be traced, and the fact that she conversed with the 911 operator for a few blocks of travel time did not provide the police with sufficient means to test the credibility of her allegation of illegal activity.”).

Distinct split of authority has developed over whether Rutzinski correctly grants greater latitude to act on anonymous complaint re: dangerous driving than other types of conduct (or, for that matter, crime). Principal case: U.S. v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2001). See also People v. Wells, CalSCt No. S128640, 6/26/06, adopting Wheat and also approving result in Lowry v. Gutierrez, 129 Cal. App. 4th 926 (2005) (greater latitude permissible because of inherent danger presented and also impossibility of predicting further recklessness; court nonetheless noting: “In the reckless driving context the information should include the vehicle’s make and model, color, license number, location and direction of travel although slight variances would not necessarily be fatal.” Lowry also stresses “the limited nature of our holding,” namely that the case simply didn’t involve “ordering the driver to exit the vehicle, or in frisking the driver or searching the vehicle. … Rather, this was as close to a voluntary encounter and discussion with a suspect as is possible when that person is in a moving vehicle.” Taking an implicitly different opinion: State v. Powell, Ind. App. No. 55A01-0502-CR-55, 2/6/06 (anonymous tip re: drunk driver providing only description of car and license plate number not enough for stop).

As suggested, courts are split nationally with regard to Rutzinski-type analysis. (Wells cites various articles on the point.) For a case citing Rutzinski with approval, along with a useful canvass of similar cases from other jurisdictions, see State v. Golotta, N.J. S. Ct. No. A-78-02, 12/16/03. Note, too, Golotta‘s stress, similar to Lowry‘s, “that situations involving erratic driving present the public with dangers not found in other situations, such as when a tipster identifies a person suspected of carrying a concealed weapon,” citing State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 732 n. 8, 796 A.2d 857 (2002) to the effect that, “The rationale for allowing less rigorous corroboration of tips alleging erratic driving is that the imminent danger present in this context is substantially greater (and more difficult to thwart by less intrusive means) than the danger posed by a person handgun.” (An admonition repeated by the Golotta court to underscore its significance: “Perhaps most important, here the officer was confronted with a risk of imminent danger to defendant and to the public, a circumstance that allowed the officer less corroboration time than if the tip had alleged that an individual standing passively on a street corner was carrying a concealed weapon.”) This formulation succinctly expresses a view that is certainly consistent with the analysis advanced by Rutzinski, albeit in somewhat different terms:

¶26 We are mindful, however, that the Adams and White analyses do not create a per se rule by which to judge the objective reasonableness of an investigative stop based on an informant’s tip. As stated above, when assessing whether a stop is constitutionally reasonable, a reviewing court must balance the interests of the individual being stopped against the interests of the State to effectively root out crime. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228; McGill, 2000 WI 38, at ¶18; Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d at 56. In light of this balancing test, we recognize that there may be circumstances where an informant’s tip does not exhibit indicia of reliability that neatly fit within the bounds of the Adams-White spectrum, but where the allegations in the tip suggest an imminent threat to the public safety or other exigency that warrants immediate police investigation. In such circumstances, the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 do not require the police to idly stand by in hopes that their observations reveal suspicious behavior before the imminent threat comes to its fruition. Rather, it may be reasonable for an officer in such a situation to conclude that the potential for danger caused by a delay in immediate action justifies stopping the suspect without any further observation. Thus, exigency can in some circumstances supplement the reliability of an informant’s tip in order to form the basis for an investigative stop. Cf. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 S. Ct. 447, 455 (2000) (noting that exigencies of some scenarios likely would outweigh the individual’s right to be free from an investigative traffic stop).

See also State v. Prendergrast, Haw. SCt No. 24793, 2/2/04 (also canvassing decisions re: anonymous tip of erratic driving, and concluding that present tip satisfied fourth amendment, stressing reliability of tip [informant provided detailed, “firsthand observations of criminal activity”]; and “the imminence of the harm” posed by the reckless driving). But see Washington v. State, 740 N.E.2d 1241 (Ind. App. 2000), anonymous call re: possible drunk driving insufficient under circumstances to support stop:

We accordingly hold that an anonymous telephone tip, absent any independent indicia of reliability or any officer-observed confirmation of the caller’s prediction of the defendant’s future behavior, is not enough to permit police to detain a citizen and subject him or her to a Terry stop and the attendant interruption of liberty required to accomplish it.

And, State v. Sousa, NH SCt No. 2003-552, 8/26/04 (canvassing post-J.L. cases):

In light of these cases, we hold the following factors, viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, are important when evaluating whether an anonymous tip gives rise to reasonable suspicion. First, whether there is a “sufficient quantity of information” such as the vehicle’s make, model, license plate number, location and bearing, and “similar innocent details” so that the officer may be certain that the vehicle stopped is the one the tipster identified. Wheat, 278 F.3d at 731. Second, the time interval between the police receiving the tip and the police locating the suspect vehicle. Id. Third, whether the tip is based upon contemporaneous eyewitness observations. Id. at 734; see Blake, 146 N.H. at 4. Fourth, whether the tip is sufficiently detailed to permit the reasonable inference that the tipster has actually witnessed an ongoing motor vehicle offense. See Golotta, 837 A.2d at 369….

These are admittedly close cases – the issue of whether reasonable suspicion supports a particular stop is fact driven and depends upon the totality of the circumstances in each case. Although we hold that the police may act on an anonymous tip of reckless or drunk driving, it is only under limited circumstances.

And, Collins v. Commonwealth, KY No. 2002-SC-0926-DG, 8/26/04 (call to 911 from gas station, reporting that driver of one vehicle “was seen throwing liquid from a bottle toward another vehicle”):

Therefore, we conclude that the tip here lacked the moderate indicia of reliability required by J .L . and White. Though accurate in its substance, the tip consisted entirely of information available to any casual observer on the street, giving the police no method of verifying that the tipster could be relied upon. The tip neither recounted nor predicted any specific illegal conduct . Moreover, the investigating officer did not independently observe any illegal activity or suspicious behavior. We do not believe that reasonable suspicion can be predicated upon an unidentified person’s accurate description of another vehicle and driver, coupled with the bare assertion that the driver had engaged in what might be considered offensive – though not criminal – conduct.

Nation-wide split, on question of whether imminent threat from drunk driving reduces need for reliability of anonymous tip, cataloged in People v. Castro, CA App No. F046915, 4/11/06 (that court going on to hold that “higher order of danger,” namely threat to kill specified individual, indeed reduced need for reliability in tip).

State v. Roosevelt Williams, 2001 WI 21, on remand, 529 U.S. 1050 (2000), previous history: State v. Roosevelt Williams, 225 Wis. 2d 159, 591 N.W.2d 823 (1999); State v. Williams, 214 Wis. 2d 412, 570 N.W.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1997)
For Williams: Melinda Swartz, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate.

Issue: “(W)hether an anonymous tip containing a contemporaneous report of drug trafficking, combined with independent observations and corroboration of details from the tip justified the investigatory stop of Williams,” ¶2.

Holding: Plurality opinion (3 votes):

¶47 In Florida v. J.L., the Supreme Court held that ‘an anonymous tip that a person carrying a gun is, without more, [in]sufficient to justify a police officer’s stop and frisk of that person.’ 120 S. Ct. at 1377 (emphasis added). Here, there is plainly so much more than a “bare-boned” tip. Id. at 1380. The information upon which the police proceeded was substantial in both quality and quantity. The anonymous tip was supported by a wide array of indicia of reliability contemporaneous eyewitness account accompanied by details promptly verified by the police. A reliable tip, such as this one, provided information of substantial quality. Added to that was information of not insignificant quantity a vehicle parked in an alleyway in broad daylight with no plates, containing two persons, one of whom was reaching behind the passenger’s seat upon the police’s arrival. Accordingly, consideration of the totality of circumstances compels the conclusion that the officers’ acted reasonably in deciding to detain Williams. We have here the necessary “cumulative detail, along with reasonable inferences and deductions which a reasonable officer could glean therefrom, [that] is sufficient to supply the reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot and to justify the stop.” Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 142. We therefore conclude that the State has met its burden of showing that the investigatory stop of Williams was justified that there was reasonable suspicion.

The court splits 4-3: a 3-vote plurality, single-vote concurrence (decisive because it represents the 4th vote), and 3 dissents. There is some, but not much, daylight between the plurality and concurrence (Justice Prosser). Start with the given principle: an anonymous tip alone can’t support reasonable suspicion. But this principle breaks down to two subsidiary issues: whether the call was 1) truly anonymous and 2) sufficiently corroborated. Justice Prosser views the informant’s identity as known rather than anonymous, and the informant therefore as presumptively reliable, ¶¶64-90. Justice Prosser’s approach has important ramifications, because he in effect takes judicial notice that any 911 call by its very nature is non-anonymous. The majority seemingly rejects that approach, ¶ 38 n. 14: “while we wish we could adopt the concurrence’s position that this is not an anonymous informant case, there is nothing in the record, and nothing of which we can take judicial notice, which would establish that a sophisticated 9-1-1 system was operating at the time the call came in to the Milwaukee Emergency Operator.” This suggests in the first instance that if a proper factual record were made a 911 call would be treated as non-anonymous even if the caller refused to provide his or her name. Second, despite this disavowal, the plurality indeed seemed to view the call as not quite anonymous:

¶35 Although the caller said that she did not “want to get involved,” by providing self-identifying information, she risked that her identity would be discovered. Consequently, the 9-1-1 caller put her anonymity at risk, contrary to Williams’ contention. We agree with the concurrence in Florida v. J.L. that if “an informant places his [or her] anonymity at risk, a court can consider this factor in weighing the reliability of the tip.” Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1381 (Kennedy, J., concurring).^[10] Risking one’s identification intimates that, more likely than not, the informant is a genuinely concerned citizen as opposed to a fallacious prankster.^[11]

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^[10]The dissent seems to suggest at ¶115 that a tipster is reliable only if he or she knowingly or intentionally risks his or her anonymity. There is no authority for such a contention. Where a tipster has reliable and accurate information about ongoing criminal activity he or she observes in a neighborhood, we want to encourage contemporaneous reporting of that activity. Such a person need not intentionally or knowingly put himself or herself at risk by personal identification. We dare not speculate what a caller risks when he or she reports criminal activity observed, but it may be much more than anonymity. Moreover, it would be difficult, if not impossible, in many instances, for a court to determine whether a tipster has knowingly or intentionally put at risk his or her anonymity by calling a police station and giving identifying information, but not specifically identifying himself or herself.
^[11] All indications here point to the conclusion that the 9-1-1 caller was not a prankster. Originally, she had identified the vehicle as a van, but then, after leaving the phone to get a better description, she describes the vehicle as a Ford Bronco. Actually, it was a Chevy Blazer, although, as the officers testified, the two vehicles are similar in appearance. That the caller misidentified the vehicle as well as left the phone to obtain a more detailed description indicates that clearly the call was not likely rehearsed.

In the end, then, plurality and concurrence differ more in slight degree than kind: plurality — on the particular facts, the caller is deemed a “citizen informant” and, therefore, presumptively reliable (which thus shifts the court’s concern from “personal” to “observational” reliability, ¶36); concurrence — as a matter of law a 911 caller is necessarily deemed a “citizen informant.” Thus, these two opinions ultimately reach the same conclusion, albeit for slightly different reasons. The plurality, it bears repeating, leaves open the distinct possibility that on the proper record a 911 call will be treated as non-anonymous even where the caller refuses to provide an identity. But it also remains possible that a given 911 caller’s refusal to give what the Williams court describes as “self-identifying” information might be meaningfully distinguished. And the dissent’s point — that the very notion of a “relaxed test of reliability” stemming from a “citizen informant” tip rests on outmoded case law, ¶111 — should be kept in mind as well.

State v. Christopher Gammons, 2001 WI App 36
For Gammons: Keith A. Findley, LAIP

Issue/Holding: Police did not have reasonable suspicion to continued detention for a routine traffic problem after the purpose of the stop was fulfilled:

¶21 In evaluating reasonable suspicion, we must examine whether all the facts, when taken together, could constitute a reasonable suspicion. State v. Allen, 226 Wis. 2d 66, 75, 593 N.W.2d 504 (Ct. App. 1999). In support of its contention that Fahrney could have reasonably suspected Gammons and the others of drug activity, the State points to the following evidence in the record: the vehicle was stopped in a “drug-related” or “drug crime” area; it was 10:00 p.m.; the vehicle was from Illinois; Fahrney had knowledge of prior drug activity by each of the three men in the vehicle; and Gammons appeared to be nervous and uneasy.

…

¶23 Other than Fahrney’s personal knowledge of prior drug activity, the circumstances the State relies on here were all present in Betow: an out-of-town vehicle in an area purportedly known for drug activity; a night-time stop; and a nervous suspect. Moreover, the State does not assert that Gammons or Farr gave an implausible story of his whereabouts like the defendant in Betow. Finally, nothing in the record demonstrates that Fahrney observed Gammons or the others say or do anything that specifically indicated drug use or possession on the night of the stop.

¶24 While Fahrney’s initial questions may have been permissible under Griffith and Gaulrapp, no additional suspicious factors suggesting drug activity developed from Farr’s responses to Fahrney’s initial questions. Therefore, Fahrney had no basis to continue to detain Gammons and the others after Farr stated that the men did not have any drugs and denied Fahrney’s first request to search the vehicle. At that point, the Fourth Amendment required Fahrney to terminate the stop and allow Gammons and the other men to continue about their business. Instead, Fahrney continued to detain the vehicle and told Farr he was going to get a police dog to sniff the car. At that moment, the stop was transformed into an unlawful detention, and the State cannot rely on Farr’s subsequent consent to search to justify the police actions. Therefore, the drug evidence the police gathered from the subsequent searches was obtained in violation of Gammons’ Fourth Amendment rights and should have been suppressed. See State ex rel. Peckham v. Krenke, 229 Wis. 2d 778, 786-87, 601 N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1999). On remand, the trial court should grant Gammons’ motion to suppress.

State v. Alisha M. Olson, 2001 WI App 284
For Olson: Daniel P. Fay

Issue: Whether the police had reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop to investigate the driver for a burglary two days earlier.

Holding:

¶8. In the present case, we find sufficient facts to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Olson had committed a crime. The Waukesha County Sheriff’s Department did not pull Olson’s name out of a hat. An anonymous caller to We Tip first made it suspect Olson. However, the two calls to the hotline were not the only facts stacking up against Olson. While talking to her mother, the officers discovered that Olson had the opportunity to commit the burglary. Finally, Olson’s purposeful avoidance of the officers evidenced at least a guilty conscience. Although avoidance of the police and refusal to cooperate may be founded in wholly innocent intentions and without more do not create reasonable suspicion, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991), ‘cases have also recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion,’ Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). In addition to specific facts, ‘the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.’ Id. at 125. In looking at the totality of the circumstances, see Gruen, 218 Wis. 2d at 590, a reasonable police officer could reasonably suspect that Olson was somehow involved in the burglary.

(Emphasis supplied.)

This may be the first Wisconsin decision to acknowledge that “police avoidance” behavior will not alone support reasonable suspicion. And see also U.S. v. Bonner, 3rd Cir No. 03-1547, 3/30/04 (“Indeed, the Supreme Court has never held that unprovoked flight alone is enough to justify a stop. The Supreme Court has held, however, that flight upon noticing police, plus some other indicia of wrongdoing, can constitute reasonable suspicion. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125-26….”)

Separately — though the point may seem obvious — with respect to the court’s discussion of “refusal to cooperate,” it should be noted that “(a) refusal to consent to a search cannot itself form the basis for reasonable suspicion,” U.S. v. Santos, 10th Cir No. 03-8059, 4/6/05.

And when, as here, investigation centers on past, rather than ongoing, criminal activity, additional analysis may be necessary, ¶9:

¶15. These circumstances parallel those in Hensley where the police had been unable to locate the suspect. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229. Here, although the police had a good idea of where Olson was, her stonewalling made any attempt at voluntary conversation impossible. A traffic stop became a reasonable solution to further the investigation. We do not say that reasonable suspicion of a past crime always justifies a traffic stop. A seizure, especially in the traffic stop context, is a serious intrusion on an individual’s liberty and must be objectively reasonable by Fourth Amendment standards. Courts must balance the intrusion on the individual against the governmental interests of the State. Here, the reasonable suspicion that Olson was involved in the burglary, the strong governmental interest in solving crimes, and the purposeful avoidance of the police by Olson make Bach’s traffic stop a reasonable one under the facts and circumstances of this case. Accordingly, Olson’s evidentiary challenge must fail, and any statements made by her during the traffic stop are admissible. We therefore uphold Olson’s judgment of conviction.

Compare, U.S. v. Grigg, 9th Cir No. 06-30368, 8/22/07 (concluding, after detailed discussion: “the rule we derive from Hensley [is] that a court reviewing the reasonableness of an investigative stop must consider the nature of the offense, with particular attention to any inherent threat to public safety associated with the suspected past violation”; complaint of prior excessive noise therefore couldn’t support stop of car).

State v. Christopher Gammons, 2001 WI App 36
For Gammons: Keith A. Findley, LAIP

Issue: Whether an officer may stop a car for not displaying a rear plate, when the car has a temporary license sticker which isn’t seen until after the stop.

Holding:

¶8 While the temporary license sticker in this case may be a better indicator of registration than the ‘license applied for’ sign in [State v.]Griffin[, 183 Wis. 2d 327, 515 N.W.2d 535 (Ct. App. 1994)], the trial court found that at the time of the stop, Fahrney did not see the temporary sticker. Therefore, like the officers in Griffin, Fahrney had no way of knowing whether Farr was in compliance with vehicle registration laws without stopping the vehicle.

However, there is authority for the idea that even though inability to see a temporary registration tag justifies a stop (where state law requires its display), if the tag is observable upon the officer’s approach to the stopped car, the purpose of the stop has been satisfied and absent reasonable suspicion the officer can’t proceed to question the driver or request license and registration, U.S. v. Edgerton, 10th Cir No. 05-3167, 2/22/06. But compare U.S. v. Kirksey, 7th Cir No. 06-2854, 5/10/07 (Edgerton line of cases narrowly limited to instances where reasonable suspicionimmediately dispelled; matching VIN didn’t obviate need to further investigate smudged plate).

State v. Lawrence A. Williams/State v. Antwon C. Mathews, 2002 WI 94, reversing 2001 WI App 249, 248 Wis. 2d 361, 635 N.W.2d 869
For Williams: Thomas E. Knothe
For Mathews: Peter J. Thompson

Issue: Whether the traffic stop was unnecessarily prolonged so as to amount to an illegal seizure and invalidate consent to search the car.

Holding:

¶27 Indeed, the circuit court made the following finding: “it is clear that, at least verbally, the trooper had given the defendant permission to be on his way.” Accordingly, the court of appeals properly focused its analysis on the events at the conclusion of the initial seizure, and immediately thereafter.⁸ Like the court of appeals, we see the case as calling for a determination of whether Williams was seized after the conclusion of the original traffic stop, when he was questioned about contraband and asked for permission to search.

¶28. This requires, as noted above, consideration of all the circumstances and application of an objective “reasonable person” standard. We know that questioning alone does not a seizure make, and the fact that this defendant–perhaps like most people–spontaneously and voluntarily responded to the officer’s questions is not enough to transform an otherwise consensual exchange into an illegal seizure. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216; Drayton, 536 U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. at 2112-13. We conclude that a reasonable person in these circumstances would not have considered himself compelled to stay and answer the officer’s questions. Stated positively, a reasonable person would have felt free to decline to answer the officer’s questions and simply “get on [his] way.”

¶29. That the officer had just invited Williams to “get on [his] way” strongly influences our conclusion. The officer’s words and actions, considered as a whole, communicated permission to leave, as the traffic stop was over. The officer did nothing, verbally or physically, to compel Williams to stay. That Williams stayed, and answered the questions, and gave consent to search, is not constitutionally suspect, and does not give rise to an inference that he must have been compelled to do so. Mendenhall specifically rejected this argument. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555-56.

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⁸ This case does not, therefore, present a question of whether the officer impermissibly exceeded the scope of or prolonged the initial seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72 (noting that a reasonable seizure can become an unreasonable one if the officer’s investigation extends beyond that which is related to the purpose of the stop, but holding that mere identification questions asked of a passenger do not make a seizure unreasonable); State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 94, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that “the scope of the officer’s inquiry, or the line of questioning, may be broadened beyond the purpose for which the person was stopped only if additional suspicious factors come to the officer’s attention . . . .”); State v. Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d 600, 558 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1996) (traffic stop not unreasonably prolonged by question about contraband in the car and subsequent request for consent to search).

Also see the very similar but crucially distinguishable case, State v. Reginald Jones / Maurice E. O’Neal, 2005 WI App 26 (consent to search car immediately after conclusion of routine traffic stop was (unlike Williams) product of illegal detention).

State v. Christopher Gammons, 2001 WI App 36
For Gammons: Keith A. Findley, LAIP

Issue: Whether, following stop of a car which seemed not to have plates, identification-related investigation of passenger is permissible once the officer discovers proof (display of temporary sticker) that there is in fact no apparent violation of registration laws.

Holding: A lawful stop doesn’t become an unreasonable seizure merely because the officer asks for the passenger’s identification. ¶12, relying on State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72.

Note, however, existence of a split of authority on whether the police may indeed ask to see a driver’s license if the basis for the stop dissipates before the actual encounter. See, e.g., Meredith v. State, Ind App No. 89A04-0703-CR-148, 12/28/07, following United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558 (10th Cir. 1994) (“once Officer Lackey had verified the valid expiration date on the temporary tag, and prior to any personal contact with Meredith, the objective purpose for the investigative detention had been satisfied”); U.S. v. Edgerton, 10th Cir No. 05-3167, 2/22/06 (similar: when cop sees that car in fact displays temporary tag then purpose of stop dissipates and can’t ask for license / registration information or otherwise question driver); and State v. Johnny Diaz, 850 So. 2d 435 (Fl. 2003), collecting cases on this split (same: stop to check out validity of temporary plate; upon approach, officer discerned that plate was in fact valid, and the authority to continue the detention, even for the purpose of asking to see the driver’s license, terminated):

Permitting an officer to further detain and interrogate a motorist, after the officer is fully satisfied that the motorist has not committed a violation of the laws of the State of Florida, violates the precepts established in Prouse and Royer. Having verified the total validity of Mr. Diaz’s temporary tag, the sheriff’s deputy could lawfully make personal contact with Mr. Diaz only to explain to him the reason for the initial stop. Because the sheriff’s deputy had no justification for further detention, anything more than an explanation of the stop was a violation of Mr. Diaz’s Fourth Amendment rights.

But compare U.S. v. Kirksey, 7th Cir No. 06-2854, 5/10/07 (Edgerton line of cases narrowly limited to instances where reasonable suspicion immediately dispelled; matching VIN didn’t obviate need to further investigate smudged plate).Gammons in effect assumes that the stop was lawful even though there was in fact no traffic violation. Whether this approach eventually prevails over Diaz, it should not be extended to one where the stop is based on erroneous, police-generated information, State v. Allen, 269 Neb. 69, 77, 1/7/05 (as distinguished from erroneous, court-generated information, Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995)):

This is not a case in which police possess factual information supporting a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity which, upon further investigation, proves to be unfounded. Here, there was no factual foundation for the information which the dispatcher transmitted to Sautter, as it is undisputed that the information was false due to the dispatcher’s mistake in running the wrong license plate number. Sautter had no other reason for initiating the stop. Thus, the record reflects that neither Sautter nor any other law enforcement personnel possessed any true fact which would support the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop. The stop was therefore an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.