by admin
on November 17, 2014
Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity
Issue (composed by Hogan’s petition for review):
1. When a person is illegally detained by law enforcement for a period of time and then is verbally released by the officers for a comparatively very brief period of time before being re-approached by the officer(s), when is the time of the officers’ disengagement of the person properly regarded as a brief interruption of the illegal detention and when should the disengagement be regarded as the end of one stop and the start of a second stop?
2. In context, does allowing a person illegally detained for approximately 15 minutes as part of a traffic stop-turned-criminal investigation to leave the scene for approximately 16 seconds before re-approaching the person adequately remove the taint of the illegal detention?
Factually and legally this case is very interesting. A deputy stopped Hogan for a seatbelt violation. After obtaining Hogan’s license and registration, the deputy called for back up from the Boscobel police department. The officer who responded told the deputy there were rumors that Hogan was a “meth cook” etc., wondered how soon they could get a drug dog at the scene, and discussed whether Hogan might be persuaded to consent to a search. The deputy asked Hogan to perform a field sobriety test, which he passed. So the deputy told Hogan he was “free to go” and started to walk to his squad car. But within 16 seconds he changed his mind, asked to speak with Hogan again, and requested permission to search his truck. Hogan agreed. The deputy found pistols, meth etc. Hogan says he was illegally seized when he consented to the search of the truck despite the deputy’s “brief disengagement” of him, and that State v. Williams, 255 Wis.2d 1, 646 N.W.2d 834 (202), relied upon by the court of appeals, is not controlling because Williams was never illegally detained to begin with. Alternatively, Hogan argues that if the illegal detention had ended, then his consent was tainted by the prior 4th Amendment violation under State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998) and State v. Bermudez, 221 Wis. 2d 338, 585 N.W.2d 628 9Ct. App. 1998).
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by admin
on November 17, 2014
Review of a court of appeals summary disposition; case activity
Issue: (composed by On Point):
Does the doctrine of sovereign immunity bar a person’s recovery for personal injuries that he sustains while in the custody of the Department of Corrections?
While the State Public defender cannot represent inmates in personal injury litigation against the DOC, this issue is important to clients who are hurt while in its custody. Mayhugh was an inmate at Redgranite Correctional Institution when he was hit in the head by a foul ball while sitting in the bleachers watching a softball game. He sustained serious permanent injuries, and thus filed a tort action against the DOC alleging negligent design of the baseball field. Naturally the, State moved to dismiss claiming sovereign immunity. The answer will turn on what §301.04 means when it says “the department may sue and be sued” and whether the DOC is an “independent state agency,” because the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply to such entities.
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by admin
on November 16, 2014
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity: 2013AP1753-CR; 2013AP1754-CR
Issue (composed by On Point)
Does Guarnero’s conviction for violating the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act qualify as a prior offense under the repeat drug offender enhancement provision of § 961.41(3g)(c) because the RICO conviction’s predicate acts involved, among other things, controlled substance offenses, thus making the RICO conviction a conviction for a crime “under a statute … relating to controlled substances”?
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by admin
on November 16, 2014
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity
Issue (composed by On Point)
When additional sentence credit is granted after an offender’s parole has been revoked, is the additional credit applied to the offender’s term of reincarceration, or to the remaining period of parole?
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by admin
on November 14, 2014
State v. David M. Carlson, 2014 WI App 124; case activity
Note to trial courts: When ineffective assistance of counsel claims are based what trial counsel said to his client, hold an evidentiary hearing. Note to defense counsel: Data showing the sentences received by defendants charged with the same crimes as your client is about as useful as data showing a patient diagnosed with a lethal illness the survival rates of similarly-diagnosed patients. Note to all: A single, inaccurate, hyperbolic remark during the course of a long sentencing explanation is harmless even if the trial court relied upon it.
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by admin
on November 14, 2014
State v. Kelly M. Rindfleisch, 2014 WI App 121; case activity
Just how “particular” must a warrant to search a Gmail and Yahoo! Mail be in order to survive the Fourth Amendment’s “particularity” requirement? And does the answer change when the warrant is for searching the email accounts of someone other than the person suspected of the crime described in the warrant? In this split opinion the majority upheld broad search warrants requiring Google and Yahoo to turn over email expected to show that one former Walker aide had committed a crime, but which showed that the account owner (another former Walker aide) had also committed a crime.
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by admin
on November 13, 2014
Tina B. v. Richard H., 2014 WI App 123; case activity
The circuit court lost competency to decide a guardianship proceeding under § 54.34 because it failed to decide the case within the statutory time limit, but the circuit court’s decisions in a related guardianship proceeding under § 48.977 are affirmed.
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by admin
on November 13, 2014
Nicole Marie Thomas v. Korry Ardell, 2014AP295, District 4, 11/13/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in refusing to admit cell phone records because the proponent of the evidence didn’t provide a proper foundation by presenting either the testimony of a qualified witness or a proper certification proving authenticity.
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