Kenosha County v. Blaire A. Frett, 2014 WI App 127; case activity
State v. Melody P.M., 2009 AP2991 (WI App June 10, 2009), a 1-judge opinion, held that Wis. Stat. § 973.015 permits circuit courts to expunge civil forfeiture violations. Here, the court of appeals explicitly overrules Melody P.M. and holds that civil forfeiture violations may not be expunged.
Dane County DHS v. Christina L., 2014AP1437, District 4, 11/20/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
There was a factual basis for Christina L.’s no contest plea to grounds for termination under § 48.415(10) because the child in this case, Aiden G-L., was “adjudged” CHIPS within three years of the involuntary termination of her parental rights to another child, Shaun L.
City of Portage v. Kenneth D. Cogdill, 2014AP1492, District 4, 11/20/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Police had probable cause to believe Cogdill had been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant based on the statements of witnesses, the officers’ own observations, and Cogdill’s statements.
Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity
Issues (composed by SCOW). See order granting review.
1. Where a defendant seeks to plead guilty or no contest to a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), or with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC), do State v. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) and due process principles require that the number of prior offenses that count for sentence enhancement be determined prior to entry of the defendant’s plea?
2. Is a court of appeals’ decision ordering remand to the circuit court with instructions to: (1) issue an amended judgment of conviction reflecting a conviction for operating with a PAC, as a seventh offense, and (2) hold a resentencing hearing, and impose a sentence consistent with the penalty ranges for a seventh offense, constitutionally impermissible under Bangert and due process principles where the defendant specifically entered a plea of guilty to PAC as a sixth offense, where the circuit court sentenced the defendant in accordance to proper penalties for PAC as a sixth offense, and where the defendant has already served the confinement portion of such sentence?
State v. Fernando Moreno-Acosta, 2014 WI App 122; case activity
While § 943.201(2) requires the state to prove the defendant used personal identifying information belonging to an actual person, it need not prove that the defendant knew the information belonged to another “real, actual person.”
State v. Jennifer M. Parisi, 2014 WI App 129; case activity
The warrantless entry into Parisi’s apartment was lawful because police had probable cause to believe the apartment contained evidence of a crime and there were exigent circumstances justifying entry without a warrant.
Glebe v. Frost, USSC No. 14-95, 11/17/14 (per curiam), reversing Frost v. Van Boening, 757 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); docket and Scotusblog page
Supreme Court precedent has not clearly established that improper restriction of a defendant’s closing argument is structural error, so the Ninth Circuit erred in granting habeas relief on that ground.
State v. Stephanie M. Przytarski, 2014AP1019-CR, District 1, 11/18/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Przytarski can’t withdraw her plea even if her trial lawyer erroneously told her that she could appeal the trial court’s pretrial order that barred her from introducing certain evidence to defend against charges of interference with child custody.
