Fond du Lac County v. D.P.E., 2025AP66-FT, 4/30/25, District II (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
COA affirms the circuit court’s orders recommitting D.P.E. (referred to as “Donald”) and authorizing the involuntarily administration of medication. Donald argued on appeal that the county did not present sufficient evidence to establish dangerousness and failed to meet its burden to prove he was not competent to refuse medication.
Donald was committed as an inmate at the Wisconsin Resource Center (“WRC”). At his first recommitment hearing in 2024, Donald appeared with counsel but made objections and cross-examined witnesses himself. (¶3). The county called a WRC psychiatrist who had examined Donald and reviewed his records from WRC, and a psychiatric care technician at WRC. (¶¶4, 10). The psychiatrist, Dr. Sarino, testified as to his observations of Donald, as well as the information he had gathered from records and discussions with others. (¶¶4-6). The technician, Brown, testified that Donald had “directly threatened” him and his coworkers, detailed several instances of these threats, and testified that the threats made him concerned for his safety and that of his coworkers. (¶10).
Donald engaged in a discussion with the circuit court, during which he stated that some of the medications he was on were helpful, but that he did not want to be on a commitment. (¶11). The county argued that it had met the Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. and (am) standards, and the court agreed. (¶¶12-13). As to the involuntary medication order, the court found that it was in Donald’s best interest, although he “does have some insight into the pros and cons of that.” (¶13). The court then signed the form orders. (¶14).
COA relies on the Sarino’s report and testimony regarding Donald’s threats and threatening behaviors, as well as Brown’s testimony. (¶¶17-18). In doing so, COA rejects Donald’s hearsay arguments related to Sarino’s testimony and report, concluding his repeated objections that Sarino was telling “lies” is insufficient to preserve a hearsay objection. (¶¶19-20). Similarly, COA concludes that Donald’s objection after the report was received was insufficient as he did not identify any legal grounds for excluding the report. (¶21). COA also rejects Donald’s argument that Brown’s testimony was vague and related only to a time period prior to his initial commitment, concluding that these “arguments do not provide grounds to disregard Brown’s testimony.” (¶22).
Finally, as to the involuntary medication order, COA concludes that Sarino’s report and testimony provided sufficient evidence to conclude that Donald was not competent to refuse medication under Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)4. (¶27). COA therefore rejects Donald’s arguments that his own statements at the hearing undermine Sarino’s opinions, and that the circuit court’s findings show that he was competent to refuse medication but the court made its determination based on its belief that the order was in his best interest. (¶29). Although COA acknowledges “that Donald’s ‘best interest’ is not a ground . . . for imposing an involuntary medication order,” it relies on the “additional findings and conclusions” in the circuit court’s written order “that track the statutory standards for the imposition of a med order and holds that “[t]he court’s reference to Donald’s best interest in its oral ruling does not furnish a basis to set aside the order.” (¶31).
This conclusion seems to rely on the standard language in the form involuntary medication order, ME-905, which the county generally prepares and files as a proposed order, often prior to the final hearing. While we are not aware of a decision applying D.J.W.‘s requirement for specific factual findings that support the court’s conclusion in the context of medication orders, relying on the form could be deemed problematic in the future. In addition, COA’s conclusion on this point seems contrary to the general principle that when a court’s oral ruling and its written order conflict, the oral ruling controls. See State v. Perry, 136 Wis. 2d 92, 113, 401 N.W.2d 748 (1987) (holding that a court’s unambiguous oral pronouncement controls over a written judgment).
