State v. Colin R. Dowling, 2024AP524, 5/1/25, District IV (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
The COA found sufficient evidence to sustain Colin Dowling’s civil forfeiture obligation for impeding traffic by driving at a slow speed. Although Dowling argued that there were no reasonable alternatives to slowing down his Tesla to preserve its battery, the COA concluded contacting roadside assistance was a safer alternative than driving 45 miles per hour on an interstate highway where the speed limit was 70.
Dowling, his wife, and their two young children drove the family’s Tesla on Interstate 90 in January 2023 from Illinois to the Wisconsin Dells area. As they approached the Dells, the Tesla’s information screen alerted Dowling that the battery was low and suggested he reduce his speed to 45 miles per hour (the posted speed limit was 70) to allow him to reach his destination in Lake Delton before the battery wore out. (¶¶ 26,30). Dowling complied and was stopped by a state trooper for impeding traffic by operating a vehicle at a slow speed, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.59(1). (¶ 1). The statute prohibits a driver from operating “at a speed so slow as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation.” Dowling was found guilty at a civil bench trial and fined $173.40.
On appeal, Dowling argued that the circuit court applied an incorrect legal standard because it determined that the statute may be violated when a vehicle’s speed has the potential to impede traffic, but does not in fact slow traffic; 2) the Tesla’s speed was not so slow as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic; and 3) reducing speed was necessary to safely operate the vehicle. (¶ 7).
The Court assumed, without deciding, that violating the minimum speed statute requires evidence that the vehicle, in fact, slowed the progress of another vehicle. (¶ 12). And the Court found the evidence was sufficient to meet this standard given that the trooper testified that vehicles had to swerve around the Tesla and that its slow speed caused a road hazard for other drivers. (¶ 13). Similarly, the Court noted evidence that vehicles were “whipping around” the Tesla and that drivers had difficulty timely recognizing that the vehicle was traveling at a slower speed was sufficient to establish that its speed was “so slow as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic.” (¶ 16).
With respect to Dowling’s defense that reducing speed was necessary to safely operate his vehicle, the Court interpreted the statute to provide such a defense “if, but only if, causing the vehicle to function at the traffic-impeding speed is logically unavoidable under the circumstances as a whole to limit the risk of danger, harm, or loss.” (¶ 24). Dowling argued he had no reasonable alternative to driving at 45 miles per hour given that he needed to preserve the Tesla’s battery capacity. However, the Court noted that the trooper testified that it would have been safer for Dowling to pull to the side of the road and call for assistance. And the Court considered that he could have used a cell phone (Dowling and his wife each testified they had a charged cell phone) to call Tesla to arrange for roadside assistance while the car was still fully operational: “a reasonable response would have been for them to set in motion roadside assistance, and to not wait to first run out of power or to have to stop on the shoulder.” (¶ 37).
Dowling argued that being stranded on the shoulder of a rural highway on a winter night with no lights and heat was not a reasonably safe alternative. But the Court considered the risks suggested by Dowling were exaggerated and “only supports the view that the option of driving until the Tesla had zero power was not reasonable under the circumstances. There were relatively safe, reasonable alternatives to avoid this: calling promptly to arrange for roadside assistance, pulling onto the shoulder or taking an earlier exit after the problem was first identified, and not draining the battery through further operation of the Tesla on the interstate at night when there was westbound traffic traveling at much higher speeds than 45 miles per hour.” (¶ 39).
Someone actually appealed this?