Extended Supervision Conditions
ES condition barring Luckett from residing”with any person in any place in which children or women reside [without] Court’s permission” neither unreasonable nor unconstitutionally overbroad.
The court of appeals stresses that Luckett’s history “demonstrates domestic violence”; indeed, the immediate crime is itself DV-related. But: the condition bars (unapproved) residence with a relative, including his own mother, without any hint of problems in that area and the court says, So what? “The circuit court did not prevent Luckett from living with a woman or child; rather, it required him to obtain the court’s permission first,” ¶13. Without even a suggestion that Luckett’s DV problems related in any way to his family, it’s hard to see how making this bar conditional rather than absolute insulates it from attack. Put it like this: the condition has to be reasonably related to rehabilitation of the defendant and protection of the community, and if Luckett has no history of familial turbulence, then it makes no sense to require judicial supervision of a non-problematic relationship. Long as we’re at it, why not just require approval before he may live with anyone? That would obviously be nonsensical, but what really is the difference? This doesn’t mean, of course, that judicial oversight was inappropriate, only that it ought to be scaled back a tad — at least, the court doesn’t bother explaining why not. Good discussion, albeit foreign authority, in State v. Lathrop, Iowa SCt No. 07-0793, 4/23/10 (condition barring contact with any minor absent permission from supervising officer overbroad).