In denying Lavinia Goodell’s application for admission to SCOW, Chief Justice Edward Ryan famously held that women practicing law are “departures from the order of nature; and when voluntary, treason against it.” Poor Ryan must be spinning like a centrifuge in his grave. Today’s edition of SCOWstats examines the rise of women advocates (never mind justices) in Wisconsin’s highest court. It is gratifying to see how the State Public Defender, the Remington Center, and other public interest organizations have helped alter “the order of nature” in SCOW.
While we’re waiting for a decision in State v. Loomis to tell us whether we can have access to the inner workings of the de facto Deus ex machina of Wisconsin sentencing proceedings, we thought you’d be interested in this investigative report on the COMPAS by the investigative reporters at ProPublica. [continue reading…]
Luna Torres v. Lynch, USSC No. 14-1096, 2016 WL 2903424 (May 19, 2016), affirming Torres v. Holder, 764 F.3d 152 (2nd Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
The definition of “aggravated felony” under federal immigration law, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), has 21 subsections covering dozens of different crimes. Many of the subsections refer to offenses “described in” particular federal statutes, all of which include the interstate commerce element necessary for federal criminal jurisdiction. A catch-all at the end of the statute says that “aggravated felony” includes “an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law….” This decision says that a state offense that lacks an interstate commerce element, but corresponds in all other ways to a listed federal offense, is an aggravated felony. [continue reading…]
Tony Thomas v. Tarry Williams, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-2610, 5/18/16
Thomas’s federal habeas petition argued the state withheld potentially exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), but didn’t raise this claim in his state postconviction proceeding so he can’t raise it in his federal habeas petition. [continue reading…]
Pretty much the only way you’ll see the terms “SPD,” “SCOW,” and any form of the verb “win” in the same sentence is if that sentence also includes the word “fantasy.” 🙂 Believe it or not, SCOW’s bitter decision last week in St. Croix County DHHS v. Michael D. allowed the State Public Defender to claim the lead in SCOWstats.com’s law firm fantasy league. Click here. Each team in the league consists of multiple law firms, except that the SPD is its own team: the Gavels. (Seriously?) Teams score a certain number of points for writing a brief, giving oral argument, and/or winning a case in SCOW. While the SPD deserves to win many SCOW cases, it racks up its points for briefs and oral arguments. For more about SCOWstats.com’s fantasy league click here. Will the SPD retain its lead? On Point will check back at the end of the term.
State v. Keith A. Wiedmeyer, 2016 WI App 46; case activity (including briefs)
In an impressive of feat of judicial activism, the court of appeals here rewrites §343.305(5)(d) and (6)(a) and defies precedent to achieve its desired outcome: the admission of statutorily invalid blood test results at OWI trials. On Point looks forward to SCOW’s take on this published court of appeals decision. [continue reading…]
State v. Chad T. Kippley, 2015AP1671-CR, 5/19/16, District 4 (unpublished opinion); case activity (including briefs)
A warden observed Kippley’s boat travelling at a slow speed in bow-up position. Based on his training and experience, the warden suspected that the boat was equipped with a motor in excess of its maximum horsepower rating, so he stopped Kippley and obtained evidence that led to Kippley’s conviction for operating a boat while intoxicated. [continue reading…]
Rock County v. S.J.M., 2016AP255-FT, 5/19/16, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity
A circuit court involuntarily committed S.J.M. under §51.20(1)(a)1 -2 after finding him mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous. S.J.M. challenged the “dangerous” determination and, specifically, the finding that he threatened his mother with serious physical harm, which made her reasonably fear violent behavior and serious harm from him. [continue reading…]
