Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2016AP46-FT, 5/4/16 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication),petition for review granted 9/13/16, affirmed, 2017 WI 57; case activity
To commit a person involuntarily, the county must show that the person is mentally ill and dangerous. To extend the commitment, the county may prove “dangerousness” by showing that “there is a substantial likelihood, based on the subject individual’s treatment record, he would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.” §51.20(1)(am). [continue reading…]
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State v. Zachary W. Swan, 2015AP1718-CR, 5/5/16, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity, including briefs
Swan was convicted of OWI 2nd with a prohibited alcohol content. On appeal he argued that the circuit court should have suppressed the results of a preliminary breath test and other evidence due to the absence of probable cause. The court of appeals initially rejected Swan’s argument on the ground of issue preclusion, but on reconsideration agreed with Swan that issue preclusion “could not apply as a matter of law.” (¶2, ¶13). It now rejects Swan’s argument on the merits and affirms. [continue reading…]
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State v. Jeffrey S. Decker, 2015AP1997-CR, District 2, 5/4/2016 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Jeffrey Decker had been banned from the UW-Oshkosh, and was arrested when he arrived at a grand opening event. The arrest was not without incident and he was charged with obstructing an officer and convicted after a jury trial. [continue reading…]
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State v. Melvin P. Vongvay, 2015AP1827-CR, District 2, 5/4/2016 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Wisconsin Stat. § 885.235(1g) makes a blood alcohol test automatically admissible in a drunk driving prosecution if the blood is drawn within three hours of the alleged driving. The court here holds that an officer who was running up against the end of that three-hour window was justified in drawing blood without seeking a warrant. [continue reading…]
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Here is the abstract for Prof. Jason Kreag’s new article on the Social Science Research Network:
The institution of the prosecutor has more power than any other in the criminal justice system. What is more, prosecutorial power is often unreviewable as a result of limited constitutional regulation and the fact that it is increasingly exercised in private and semi-private settings as the system has become more administrative and less adversarial. Despite this vast, unreviewable power, prosecutors often rely on crude performance measures focused on conviction rates. The focus on conviction rates fails to capture and adequately evaluate the breadth of prosecutorial decision-making. We can do better by fully implementing analytics as a tool to evaluate the prosecutorial function. [continue reading…]
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Ocasio v. United States, USSC No. 14-361, (May 2, 2016), affirming United States v. Ocasio, 750 F.3d 399, (4th Cir. 2014); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
That post title is Justice Thomas’s view of the majority’s decision in this case, and he is not the lone dissenter. The Hobbs Act makes it a crime to obstruct, delay or affect commerce by extortion. It defines extortion as the obtaining of property from another with his consent, induced by wrongful use of force, violence or fear, or under color of official right. 18 U.S.C. §1951(b)(2). In a split decision with an odd alignment of justices, the majority holds that “a group of conspirators can agree to obtain property ‘from another’ in violation of the [Hobbs] Act even if they agree only to transfer property among themselves.” (Slip op. Sotomayor, J. dissenting at 1). [continue reading…]
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That’s what we suspect anyway. In 2011, Kansas passed the Offender Registration Act, which requires persons convicted of certain felonies to register with state authorities. That prompted the question of whether applying the Act to persons convicted before it went into effect would violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Last week, the Kansas Supreme Court issued a 4-3 opinion answering “yes.” A few hours later it issued another 4-3 opinion reversing itself on the very same issue. How could this happen? You’ll have to click here or here to find out!
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Michael Miller v. Dushan Zatecky, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-1869, 4/26/2016
An Indiana state court sentenced Michael Miller to a total of 120 years in prison on three counts of child molestation. On direct appeal, his lawyer raised challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of other-acts evidence, but did not contest the length of his sentence. Miller then filed a state collateral attack, alleging his original appellate counsel was ineffective for not attacking the sentence. [continue reading…]
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