United States v. Lemurel E. Williams, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-1194, 4/26/16
Williams is entitled to a new trial because under the totality of the circumstances, the jury’s continued deliberations after an aborted delivery of the initial verdict were impermissibly coercive. [continue reading…]
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As readers may know, the prosecutors in the so-called “John Doe” cases have filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. [continue reading…]
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Donovan M. Burris v. Judy P. Smith, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2891, 4/28/16
Burris’s claim that a supplemental instruction to the jury about how to determine “utter disregard for human life” doesn’t present a claim for federal habeas relief because it presents only a claim about an error of state law, not a claim that the instruction violated federal constitutional law. [continue reading…]
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State v. G.H., 2015AP1606, District 1, 4/28/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
G.H.’s parental rights to M.R.H. were terminated on the grounds that M.R.H. remained in need of protection or services under § 48.415(2) and that G.H. had failed to assume parental responsibility under § 48.415(6). The court of appeals rejects his claims that these statutes are unconstitutional as applied to him. [continue reading…]
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by admin
on April 28, 2016
State ex rel. Antjuan Redmond v. Brian Foster, 2014AP2637, District 2, 4/27/16, certification granted 6/15/16, certification vacated and case returned to the court of appeals 9/15/16; case activity (including briefs)
Issue:
Whether an offender whose parole and extended supervision was revoked after a revocation hearing has an adequate remedy other than a writ of habeas corpus to pursue a claim that the attorney who represented him during the hearing rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance? Specifically, must the offender raise a claim of ineffective assistance of revocation counsel in a motion to the division of hearings and appeals (DHA) in the department of administration? [continue reading…]
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by admin
on April 27, 2016
State v. Joshua Java Berry, 2016 WI App 40; case activity (including briefs)
Berry was found guilty at a bench trial of being a felon in possession of a firearm under § 941.29(2)(a) (2013-14). Before sentencing, Berry’s lawyer figured out that Berry’s prior conviction was for a misdemeanor, not a felony. The court vacated the felon-in-possession conviction and dismissed the charge with prejudice, and the state immediately recharged him under § 941.29(2)(b) (2013-14) because Berry had a prior delinquency adjudication. (¶¶2-6). Recharging him doesn’t violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. [continue reading…]
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by admin
on April 27, 2016
State v. Phillip Kareen Green, 2015AP1126-CR, 4/26/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Green argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first degree reckless homicide because it didn’t prove he acted with utter disregard for human life. He also argues for a new trial in the interest of justice on the grounds that: 1) the jury wasn’t fully instructed about the interaction between self-defense and the utter disregard element; and 2) important facts were not introduced or placed in proper context. The court of appeals rejects Green’s claims in a decision heavy on facts and light on analysis. [continue reading…]
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by admin
on April 25, 2016
State v. James Elvin Lagrone, 2016 WI 26, 4/22/2016, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, majority opinion by Ziegler, dissent by A.W. Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)
Lagrone wasn’t told he had the right to testify during the second, mental responsibility phase of his NGI trial. He alleged in his postconviction motion that he didn’t know he had any such right. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. The supreme court now affirms that denial in an opinion that neither (1) decides whether Lagrone had a right to testify during the second phase, nor (2) explains how the denial of that right, if it exists, can be raised in postconviction proceedings. [continue reading…]
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