State v. Alberta R. Rose, 2013AP2783-CR, District 2, 6/4/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
A police officer’s observations of a car “smoothly swerving three or four times” in its lane of travel over several blocks and then “appear[ing] to strike the center line” (¶2) provided reasonable suspicion to perform a valid investigatory stop of the car, even though an enhanced version of the squad car video showed the car didn’t hit the center line.
State v. Antonio D. Williams, 2013AP814; 6/3/14; District 1; (not recommended for publication); case activity
This appeal raises a host of issues but the most interesting concern the trial court’s decisions to: (1) prohibit defense counsel from cross-examining the State’s cooperating witnesses, all of whom were testifying in the hopes of receiving reduced sentences for themselves, about the maximum penalties they faced; and (2) allow the State to use a letter police found in an envelope marked “for my lawyer” to impeach Williams’s alibi witness.
Carol Anne Bond v. United States, USSC No. 12-148 (June 2, 2014), reversing United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149 (3rd Cir. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
Avoiding a constitutional question about the limits on Congress’s power to pass legislation implementing an international treaty, a majority of the Supreme Court narrowly construes a federal statute enacted after ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention so that it does not cover the defendant’s conduct in this case. By limiting the statute’s reach, the Court’s construction will preclude federal prosecutors from using it to charge “a purely local crime[.]” (Slip op. at 2).
A young, female law student posed this provocative question to Chuck Klosterman, The Ethicist for The New York Times. An excerpt from the Ethicist’s column in yesterday’s New York Times Magazine is copied in below.
IF IT PLEASES THE COURT . . .
I am a young, female law student who represents indigent clients in criminal matters. I have learned (both from professionals at my school and from studies on subliminal biases) that female attorneys are more likely to be taken seriously if they have straight hair and wear makeup, skirts and heels. This is not a norm I want to perpetuate. However, I know that I have an ethical responsibility to represent my clients to the best of my ability. But do I have to conform to gender norms I find oppressive if there is a chance it will help my client? NAME WITHHELD
Esteban Martinez v. Illinois, USSC No. 13-5367 (May 27, 2014) (per curiam), reversing State v. Martinez, 990 N.E.2d 215 (Ill. 2013)
In this unanimous per curiam decision, the Supreme Court reaffirms two clear rules of criminal procedure: jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn; and a trial court’s dismissal of the case due to insufficient evidence is an acquittal. Added together, the two rules mean the defendant cannot be retried.
Freddie Lee Hall v. Florida, USSC No. 12-10882, May 27, 2014, reversing Hall v. State, 109 So. 3d 704 (Fla. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)
Because “intellectual disability is a condition, not a number,” and an IQ score is an approximation, not a final and infallible assessment of intellectual functioning, the Supreme Court invalidates Florida’s bright-line rule that a defendant is not intellectually disabled—and thus may be executed—if he has never scored below 70 on an IQ test.
State v. Joshua D. Winberg, 2013AP2661-CR, District 3, 5/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The driver of a car stopped based on officer’s knowledge that the car owner’s license was revoked was not unlawfully seized because, even thought it was immediately apparent the car owner was not driving, the police also immediately observed additional suspicious information that justified the continued detention of the driver.
Price County DHHS v. Sondra F., 2013AP2790, District 3, 5/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
A respondent in a ch. 51 mental commitment proceeding does not have either a statutory or a due process right to be physically present at the final hearing under § 51.20. To the extent § 885.60(2)(a) provides a right to be physically present, it does not mandate physical presence, and the right under that statute is forfeited if the respondent fails to object to the videoconferencing or fails to request to be physically present.
