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Extradition Procedure – Waiver of Potential IAD (§ 976.05) Violation by Conduct — Discharge of Counsel

State v. Andrew S. Miller, 2003 WI App 74, PFR filed 4/11/03
For Miller: Brian C. Findley, SPD, Madison Appellate


¶12. This court has found that rights under the Detainer Act “are statutory in nature and may be waived by a defendant’s request for a procedure inconsistent with its provisions.” Brown, 118 Wis. 2d at 386. By firing his lawyer six days before the scheduled start of trial and twenty-eight days before the expiration of the time period, Miller requested such a procedure. …¶14. Alternatively, Miller argues that even if he did waive his rights under the IAD, he only waived them for the time up until his last scheduled November trial date. He argues that even if his action tolled the time limits of the IAD from July 3, 2001, to November 2001, the State still failed to try him in a timely manner. However, he cites no authority for the proposition that rights to a speedy trial can kick in after they have been waived. The law is that a defendant “cannot be heard to complain about delay caused by his own conduct,” and that such conduct “need not be called delaying tactics to be identified as time consuming impediments to an early trial.” Norwood v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 343, 357, 246 N.W.2d 801 (1976). Having asked for, and accepted, treatment inconsistent with his rights under the IAD, the defendant cannot then assert those rights in an effort to win dismissal of charges.

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